GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONALISM IN ENGLAND, SCOTLAND AND WALES
Sophie Boulter, Xavier University

This paper examines the ways that globalization and nationalism have impacted Britain, focusing on three of its countries: England, Scotland, and Wales. It also considers the impact of devolution and Brexit—both byproducts of globalization and nationalism—on England, Scotland, and Wales. I conclude that globalization increases nationalism, but the form/style of globalization (Anglo-American or European) and nationalism (ethnic or civic, and “macro” vs. “mini”) varies by country. Nationalism in each country was closely related to how devolution was approached and how much power was devolved. The form of nationalism practiced by the country, the type of globalization it favored, and the amount of devolution it received was strongly related to its Brexit vote.

The United Kingdom joined what would eventually become the European Union (EU) in 1972 under the Heath Government (“Into Europe” 2019). Since then, the world has faced “growing economic and cultural globalization and, in Europe, increasing political integration under the auspices of the European Union” (Sampson 2007a). As globalization flourished, the EU flourished with it; the EU benefited from globalization’s emphasis on supranational organizations and economic interdependence (Ravenhill 2017; Porter and Coleman 2000). Over the years, Euroskepticism—distrust in the European Union, especially from its member-states—particularly grew in England as other UK regions benefited from devolved legislatures and EU funding more than England did (Brien 2018). England did not receive a devolved parliament or assembly and received the least amount of EU funding per person than any of the other UK regions (Brien 2018). Many see Britain’s 2016 vote to leave the European Union as a reaction to globalization (Nixon 2019; Sampson 2017b; Heath and Richards 2019). But this reaction varied depending on the region of Britain. England and Wales voted to leave by 53.4% and 52.5%, respectively; Scotland voted to Remain by 62% (“EU Referendum Results” 2016). The nationalism of each country in the United Kingdom is distinct; some areas emphasize a civic nationalism whereas others emphasise an ethnic nationalism (Weber 2004). Nationalism is “a political creed that underlies the cohesion of modern societies and legitimizes their claim to authority. Nationalism centers the supreme loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people upon the nation-state, either existing or desired” (Kohn qtd. in Kamenka 1973).

Globalization is “a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation of the spatial organization of social relations and transactions” (Held et al. qtd in “Globalisation” 2017). The IMF adds that globalization results in an “increasingly free flow of ideas, people, goods, services and capital [which] leads to the integration of economies and societies” (Aninat 2002). Many Britons saw both the financial crash in 2008 and Brexit as closely related phenomena to globalization (Blockmans 2016). Supranational institutions such as the European Union have benefited under globalization (Porter and Coleman 2000). The EU specifically is friendly to globalization due to its emphasis on economic integration and interdependency (Ruane and Sutherland 2002). But the form of globalization that the EU favors is quite distinct
from Anglo-American globalization (I will explain this in the next section). The EU promotes (its form of) globalization and civic nationalism by promoting multiculturalism and an overarching European identity of unity and peace (Dittrich 2005; Nicolaïdis 2004). Just as globalization empowers regions to seek more rights and even independence, the EU promotes regional rights and semi-autonomy which often leads to regional nationalism (Molchanov 2005; McCann 2016).

Globalization was a catalyst for devolution in Britain in 1997 (MacKinnon 2001; Hanley 2011; McCann 2016). Devolution, the process in Britain which created “separate legislatures and executives in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland” was enacted so decisions could be adapted for different areas in the UK, rather than implementation via a one-size-fits-all approach (“Devolution: Factsheet” 2019). Prior to this, decision making in the UK was so centralized that the same policies were applied to different regions without nuance—this led to discontent (Paun et al. 2019). After a short period of complacency after devolution, affected countries became more nationalistic due to increased independence from the UK Government; “devolution had got off to an easy start, lulling Whitehall into a sense of false security, which became complacency and neglect” (Hazell 2015). This increased nationalism culminated in the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence (Mullen 2014).

The UK Government did not consider the impact that devolution and the 2014 Scottish independence referendum would have on English nationalism (Wayne 2019). As Tam Dalyell, the Scottish Labour MP for West Lothian noted, Welsh, Scottish, and Northern Irish MPs can vote on issues that only affect the English; yet, English MPs, until Parliament agreed to the English Votes for English Laws (EVEL) process in 2015, were not allowed to legislate for “the domestic affairs of Scotland . . . nor any part in drawing up secondary legislation for the domestic affairs of Wales” since 1999 (“English Votes for English Laws” 2019; Bogdanor 2010). The West Lothian Question, coupled with reactions to Scottish and other regional nationalisms and lessened funding for England per person compared to other UK regions led to the purest expression of English nationalism to date: Brexit (Wayne 2019). Those who identified with England more than Britain were much more likely to support Brexit—“two thirds of those who considered themselves more English than British voted to leave; two thirds of those who considered themselves more British than English voted to remain” (Ashcroft 2019). After Brexit, the percentage of Scottish and Welsh people in favor of independence skyrocketed (Shipton 2019; Paterson 2019). This assertion of English nationalism was seen as a threat to the Scots who tend to hold an “internationalist self-image” (Marsden 2018). In Wales, Welsh-speakers were “among the least likely groups in Wales to vote Leave (approx. 28% of fluent speakers)” (Larner 2019). But other groups in Wales (especially in the coal and steel heartlands) are strongly Euroskeptic (Scully 2017).

Globalization

Having been an imperial power, Britain was predisposed towards globalization: its empire “covered around 25% of the world’s land surface, including large swaths of North America, Australia, Africa and Asia” and “oversaw around 412 million inhabitants, or around 23% of the world’s population at the time” (“How Big Was the British Empire” 2019). Its sheer global reach
coupled with its reliance on trade across the world differentiated it from similar empires including the Spanish and Portugeuse empires (Martell 2008). Imperial links were “transnational” and “less centred on state power”; this lead to “ongoing legacies in terms of British integration into processes of globalization” (Martell 2008). As the empire fell, Britain maintained its cultural and trade relationships with other countries, especially America, the EU and the Commonwealth; these relationships helped create a globalized network of countries (Shaw 2003; Martell 2008). Britain continued to utilize this network throughout the decades after the empire diminished, and continued to be culturally influenced by Europe and especially America.

The British affinity with America—especially through its shared language, historical ties and similar economic system—has made it more predisposed to Atlanticism rather than Europeanism (Tilford 2017; Martell 2008). This affinity, which notably effects England more than other territories in the UK (Blockmans 2016), still exists today in areas including “shared concerns and values, to tourism and other personal links, to popular culture, arts, sport, education, government and society, and the perceived personal trustworthiness of ordinary people in each country” (Donaldson 2018). The British relationship with Europe gradually became more fractured, especially throughout the latter part of the twentieth century. Britain reluctantly joined the European Economic Community (the Common Market, which would eventually become the EU) in 1973, after its entry was blocked by French President Charles De Gaulle twice (“Timeline” 2016). But as early as 1975, Britain held a referendum on EEC membership (“Timeline” 2016). The next few decades saw greater European integration and corresponding backlash from Britain—in 1988 Margaret Thatcher spoke against “a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels,” and Britain opted out of joining the single currency in 1992 (Wilson 2014). After the large influx of central European immigrants from 2004 on, and the Euro crisis and financial crash in 2008, British Euroskepticism was at an all time high, which prompted David Cameron to call a referendum on EU membership (“Timeline” 2016). Feelings towards Europe heavily influence British feelings towards globalization; Euroskeptics tend to support a type of globalization that is more traditionally American than European—less regulation, pro-business, fewer social programs to offset perceived excesses of globalization—whereas Europhiles support the sort of globalization that is more EU friendly: regulated with a robust welfare state to support those disadvantaged by globalization (Martell 2008; Molchanov 2005).

After considering factors including openness, foreign direct investment, growth, and imports, the UK is among the most globalized of the OECD economies (Hirst and Thompson 2000). But globalization has had negative effects for certain sectors, especially manufacturing: the UK “has surrendered a very large part of its internationally competitive manufacturing sector. . . to international investors” (Hirst and Thompson 2000). Less skilled workers tend to have a negative view of globalization, along with other workers who feel as if they will be disadvantaged by its rise (Sanz and Coma 2008). Recent surveys of the British public found that though most Britons are wary of large-scale immigration, they hold generally positive views towards most other aspects of globalization (Waal 2019). The financial crash in 2008 led to a sharp reevaluation of globalization in Britain (Lane 2012). The crash enhanced job insecurity and raised the cost of living—these two issues also disproportionately hurt Britons in poverty, leading
certain populations to distrust or wish to reform globalization (Hanley 2011). Those who voted Leave in the Brexit referendum (mostly English and Welsh) tended to blame the EU and its pursued type of globalization for the financial crash (Crafts 2019; Serricchio et al. 2013). Scotland blamed the (mostly English-dominated) Westminster neoliberal type of globalization for the financial crash (Scotland’s Economy 2013).

Responses to globalization and Brexit vary by the region of the UK. Scotland’s firmly pro-EU stance led it to reject Brexit and reject the Atlanticist form of globalization favored by England (Curtice and Montagu 2017; Tomlinson 2014). The European Union’s conception of globalization, which Scotland aligns with, views free movement as a fundamental aspect of a globalized society (Scotland’s Economy 2013; Blockmans 2016; Molchanov 2005). England favored an “à la carte form of globalization with the EU that only includes goods and capital” rather than freedom of movement (Blockmans 2016). This view led many pro-Brexit individuals to support a “Canada-plus” agreement in which the UK would broadly negotiate its own free trade deal with the EU, “with the aim of agreeing better access for services and provisions for enhanced regulatory co-operation, to try to minimise trade barriers where possible” (“Summary: Trade After Brexit” 2018). Wales views globalization somewhat similarly to England: on balance, the country views large-scale immigration, offshored jobs and the resulting job insecurity negatively, but views trade and foreign investment positively (Hywel et al. 2008). Many of its industries, such as coal, steel and manufacturing have been offshored or rendered obsolete by globalization (Hywel et al. 2008). But, like Scotland, Wales is more receptive to EU-supported social programs due to its strong center-left, social-democratic tradition (Elliot et al. 2013).

Given this information it is unsurprising to note that Wales voted to leave the EU, but by a lesser majority than England did (“EU Referendum Results” 2016). Brexit is not merely a simple reaction against globalization as pundits stated (see Elliot 2016 and Nixon 2019); nor is it uniform across the British state—England, Scotland, and Wales all have distinct views on globalization, influenced by each country’s unique politics, history, and culture.

**Nationalism**

States are made stronger when they are formed of a nation, or nations, just as “the fusion with the modem state renders the nation a more concrete and stable community” (Psarrou 2003). The distinction between different types of nationalism is important in fully understanding the concept of nationalism (Weber 2004). Civic nationalism is “a political identity built around shared citizenship in a liberal-democratic state” and it is inclusive—citizens “need not be unified by commonalities of language or culture” (Stilz 2009). Civic nationalists require allegiance to the democratic principles and institutions of the state (Stilz 2009). An ethnic nationalism is a political identity resulting from “ethnic-cultural background”; it “depends on the accident of origin” and/or “early socialization” (Miscetic 2018). Nationalism also varies in scale and preferred result. “Mini-nationalisms” may be cultural or political, but they tend to demand semi-autonomy rather than independence (Snyder qtd in Yun 1990). “Macro-nationalisms” are focused on independence and aim “to extend nationalism on wider political, economic, cultural, religious or ethnic grounds” (Snyder qtd in Yun 1990).
Globalization is often seen as a threat to state sovereignty and institutions; supranational entities such as the European Union have created bodies that devolve power to regions within states, endowing them with greater involvement in decision making (Molchanov 2005; McCann 2016). So the processes of globalization and European integration benefit from regional nationalism and vice versa (Molchanov 2005; McCann 2016). But as the EU gives regions within its member-states more power, it encourages further “political fragmentation” (Habermas qtd in Molchanov 2005).

Nationalism in the United Kingdom is complicated by “the protracted problem of ‘Britain’ vs. the ‘four nations’ and ‘empire’” (Swenson 2018). James I used the term “Britain” after the “union of the crowns in 1603” to promote British identity, but this was not effective until the formal Act of Union in 1707 “which established the united kingdom of Britain” (Kumar 2003). The British Empire was often perceived as, and even referred to as the “English empire” (Taylor qtd in Kumar 2003). Yet until the empire’s post-World War II demise, Scotland was largely complacent with its position within the empire, because “the Scottish ruling order found that it had given up statehood for a hugely profitable junior partnership in the New Rome” (Nairn qtd in Warren 2014). Scotland’s autonomous institutions allowed it a fair amount of self-rule, which also deterred Scottish nationalism (Clark 1989).

Similarly, throughout the industrial revolution and the early twentieth century, Wales was an industrial powerhouse, “central to the global economy with its production of coal, slate, tinplate, flint and copper, along with the shipping associated with these goods” (Hywel et al. 2008). The country was so politically assimilated that many “Welshmen, especially Welsh patricians, increasingly saw and spoke of themselves as Englishmen” (Clark 1989). Both Wales and Scotland were also, like the English ruling-class, strongly Protestant and heavily influenced by the Reformation (Brodie 2018; “Scotland’s History - The Scottish Reformation” 2014). So, though both countries had strong Celtic cultures and traditions, economic, political, and religious incentives diminished their nationalism. The economic and political incentives have markedly changed, as I will explain in sections VI and VII.

England

Historically, English nationalism was a cautious thing. While Scotland and other countries in the UK developed a national identity that opposed British identity, the English were “conscious that Britain and the Empire were largely their creatures” and were wary of associating too closely a cultural identity with the superiority England enjoyed over other countries in the United Kingdom (Asari et al. 2008). Pride in the British empire presented fewer issues for the union than pride in the English empire—“when you are in charge, or think you are in charge, you do not go about beating the drum” (Kumar qtd in Asari et al. 2008). Many believed that the English did not need, and could not form a strong nationalism because of the country’s unique “continuity – undisrupted by the wars, revolutions and nation-building of the [European] Continent” (Mandler qtd. in Swenson 2018). There was no “tragic past” from which nationalism could be formed, nor was there any proclivity to create a “national consciousness” (Butterfield qtd in Swenson 2018). Yet, the nationalistic sense was there, albeit obscured; the jingoism that came from a successful empire perpetuated nationalistic furvor (Richmond 1984). When the
English feel emotional, patriotic feelings towards Britain, these feelings are often associated with England rather than Britain (Kumar 2003). “To identify with 'British' is not the same as identifying with the warmth and width of English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish. 'British' is a limited, utilitarian allegiance simply to those political and legal institutions which still hold this multinational state together” (Crick qtd in Kumar 2003). But England is lauded as “the font of freedom and the standard of civilization, a place of virtue as well as beauty” (Kumar 2003).

Throughout the twentieth century, Britain lost its empire, but this did not temper English nationalism. The Falklands War in 1982 “provided an opportunity to prove that old-fashioned jingoism flourishes, and that an essentially 'English' form of nationalism is not dead” (Richmond 1984). But even this event did not ignite English nationalism as devolution did in 1997. England watched as Scotland and Wales received devolved powers, without receiving a devolved assembly of its own (Bogdanor 2010). Devolution, “by ignoring the majority group. . . undermined the consolidation of an integrated civic British identity” (Asari et al. 2008). Scotland received a referendum on its independence in 2014—England did not even have English Votes for English Laws at the time—further encouraging English resentment towards the devolved countries. When the Tories passed EVEL in 2015, they hoped English nationalism could be tempered, but this legislation made little difference—the rules for how the legislation would be implemented were too complicated, and it even seemed to confuse MPs (Kenny 2019; Gourtsoyannis 2019). Labour was “squeezed between Scottish and English nationalism” (Kenny 2015) with the Conservatives and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) attracting the votes of “shy English nationalists” (Kaufmann 2015). 2016 saw the rise of resentment towards the EU, led not only by UKIP but also members of the Conservative Party. This resentment contributed to Britain leaving the European Union (Jeffery 2018)—England voted 53.4% to 46.6% to leave the EU, making it the most pro-Brexit country in Great Britain (“EU Referendum Results” 2016).

Pro-Brexit MPs in Westminster were keen to adopt a form of globalization friendly to free movement of goods and capital, rather than free movement of people (Blockmans 2016)—the “globalizing Anglo-Saxon capitalism” so favored by the English (Martell 2008). Churchill, referring to Britain and America, spoke of “the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples,” or the natural friendship between two English-speaking countries with “not just a shared history but a shared belief in the great principles of freedom and the rights of man” (Churchill qtd in Wallace and Phillips 2009). This Atlanticism affects England more than other territories in the UK, especially compared to Europhile Scotland (Curtice and Montagu 2017; Tomlinson 2014). A 2003 Eurobarometer survey taken when the UK was still in the EU showed that when asked about US influence on globalization, “UK respondents were the most positive out of respondents from EU member states . . . When asked for their views on the EU’s influence on globalization UK respondents were the most negative” (Martell 2008). England, which constituted the majority of the 2003 Eurobarometer survey, specifically has more of a penchant for American-style globalization—neoliberal, unencumbered free trade without the robust protections and safety net of social-democracies (Martell 2008; Molchanov 2005)—than any other country in the UK. In the past, the EU helped the UK thrive in the world market, but “there is now a fundamental clash with the UK’s Anglo-American model of capitalism; the UK’s model is now more liberal than any of its continental counterparts and so for the UK to continue to liberalise its economy, it had to leave the EU behind” (Jacotine 2017). As shown by table 1 (see
page 36) from Heath and Richards (2018), those who identify as English rather than British are most likely to insist upon the UK’s ability to negotiate its own free trade deals outside of the EU (Heath and Richards 2018). This table also shows that those who identify as English are most keen to stop free movement, showing that the sort of globalization favored by English identities is not the Europeanized sort favored by the EU (Heath and Richards 2018).

When polled, Brexit voters were twice as likely (39% to 18%) to identify as English, not British (Ashcroft 2019). This is consistent with the ethnic nature of English nationalism. People who identified as “English only” were most likely to emphasize factors central to ethnic nationalism as being crucial for being English, such as native birth, ancestry, and speaking the English language (Heath and Richards 2018). Only 32% of English ethnic minorities identify as English, but 61% of white English identify as English (Easton 2018). About 75% of the BME (Black Minority Ethnic) population identifies as British—a less ethnically nationalist identity (Easton 2018). English identity was also associated with a higher emphasis on national sovereignty compared to other identities within Britain (Richards et al. 2018). This makes the English more skeptical of transnational bodies like the EU (Richards et al. 2018). The macro-nationalism of England seems to be driven by a desire for independence from the EU, rather than independence from the UK. Additionally, as shown in figure 1 (see page 37), the EU funds England substantially less per person, compared to the average in other countries in the UK (Brien 2018). Though the EU emphasizes regionalism through its bodies that devolve power to regions within states, English citizens were (comparatively) neglected in funding terms by the EU.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National identities and red lines (percentages, weighted, N = 3027, data collected online April-May 2018)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No EU role in UK lawmaking</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welsh only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British preferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English preferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other preferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Heath and Richards (2018)
There are many poor places, especially in the North of England, that need EU funding; this feeling of being “left behind” heavily contributed to the Brexit vote in some parts of England (Richards et al. 2018). Some of the “left behind” parts of England that voted for Brexit have nationalist parties, including Yorkshire and Cornwall (“EU Referendum Results” 2016). These parties are not strongly influential like other UK nationalist parties and have no seats in Parliament (Watts 2017). Cornwall has its own language and culture which makes it distinct from England but its nationalism has limits as it depends on England economically (Watts 2017). Similarly, Yorkshire has a distinct culture and history from other regions in England but, when offered “limited political powers from Parliament to elected regional assemblies,” the 78% of voters in the Northeast rejected the proposal (Woodcock 2014). The nationalism of Cornwall and Yorkshire could be classified as a mini-nationalism because it tends to demand semi-autonomy and cultural protection rather than independence; this contrasts it from a macro-nationalism like Scottish nationalism (Snyder qtd in Yun 1990).

Scotland

Scotland has a distinct history, culture and (mostly unspoken) language for centuries, but that is insufficient for a strong macro-nationalism, as the cases of Yorkshire and Cornwall prove. There must be a strong demand for independence and a continued emphasis on extending the nationalism. The Act of Union in 1707 allowed Scotland to retain “its own systems of law and local administration as well as its educational and financial institutions” (Reams et al. 2017). But even though Scotland had its own institutions, it was still heavily integrated within the Westminster system and was happy with the position it enjoyed within the UK (Nairn qtd in Warren 2014). The liberal amount of self-rule allotted to Scotland, combined with strong ties to
the Union, deterred Scottish nationalism (Clark 1989). The Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), which largely drove Scottish nationalist politics after its creation in 1934, did not gain traction until the 1960s (“History: About the SNP” 2019; Agatstein et al. 2015). So, Scotland’s macro-nationalism came about quite recently (Jackson 2014).

During the 1960s, the SNP exploited electoral trends across Britain which saw “the stable two-party system of Labour and Conservative partially upended” (Agatstein et al. 2015). The SNP was originally “governed by a ‘ruling myth’ that it was neither of the left or the right but constituted a new politics that sought to put Scotland first” (Lynch 2009). But its transition to the left in the 1960s—to become a social-democratic party with policies beyond Scottish independence—attracted dissatisfied Conservative and Labour voters who now saw the SNP as a credible alternative (Agatstein et al. 2015; Lynch 2009). The SNP shift to the left helped the party avoid being dismissed as “Tartan Tories” (Agatstein et al. 2015).

The SNPs success in the late 1960s led the Labour and Conservative parties to adopt more devolution-friendly policies (Rikihisa 2013). The SNP’s success in the 1970s was due to the economic crisis and discovering oil in the North Sea (Rikihisa 2013). The economic crisis was “caused by the Oil Shock in 1973 and deteriorating industrial relations at that time”; this led voters to mistrust the two main parties (Rikihisa 2013). When oil was discovered in the North Sea, the SNP responded with the “It’s Scotland’s Oil” campaign and used this campaign to assert the notion that Scotland could be economically independent from the rest of Britain (Rikihisa 2013). The strength of the SNP and the rising tide of Scottish Nationalism coincided with a weak, unpopular Labour Party; to appease Labour backbenchers and Scottish Nationalists, a devolution referendum was held in 1979 (Denver et al. 1998). Though 51% of Scots voted in favor of the referendum, which would have created a Scottish Assembly (Denver et al. 1998), “a technicality requiring 40 per cent of all registered voters to vote in favour” prevented the referendum from taking effect (Scotland's Future - Your Guide 2013). After this, the SNP lost nine of its eleven seats in the UK Parliament, and its vote share continued to drop throughout the 1980s until it recovered in the later 1980s (Rikihisa 2013). Its recovery was partially due to the “Independence in Europe” policy it promoted, which assured voters that “Scotland would be part of a type of political and economic support system which would remove the threat of massive disruption in the case of independence” (Rikihisa 2013). This policy program was the beginning of strong Europhilia within the Scottish Nationalist movement (Rikihisa 2013).

Nationalistic fervor continued to rise through the nineties in reaction to the increasingly unpopular Conservative government; the popular New Labour government led by Tony Blair committed to devolution as it was a political necessity (Rikihisa 2013, Denver et al. 1998). Accordingly, in 1997, “Scotland voted in a referendum for a Scottish Parliament with tax-varying powers”; then, “in 1999, the Scottish Parliament was re-established as a devolved parliament within the United Kingdom” (Scotland's Future - Your Guide 2013).

Devolution to Scotland has been described as “asymmetrical” compared to the devolved powers given to the other regions in the UK; Scots gained more independence than any other territory in the UK (Bivand et al. 2010; Asari et al. 2008; “Devolution: Its Effect on the Practice of Legislation” 2004). Devolution also lessened Scotland’s historical dependence on the UK economy (Elias 2019); economic dependence was one of the most fundamental driving forces of Scottish unionism (Nairn qtd in Warren 2014; Clark 1989). When devolution first occurred in
1999, there was “[Labour] political alignment across Great Britain” but “this changed in 2007 when the Scottish National Party (SNP) took office in Scotland, and after 2010 as the Conservative Party came to power in Westminster” (Cheung et al. 2019).

The financial crash of 2008 caused doubts about the economic viability of the Westminster government—the Scots blamed the (mostly English) Westminster government’s neoliberal policies for the crash (“Scotland’s Economy: The Case for Independence” 2018). In response, the devolved Scottish Government “was able to mobilise the resources of the public sector in Scotland to implement a distinctive Economic Recovery Plan” (“Scotland’s Economy: The Case for Independence” 2018) which led to a lessened recessionary impact on Scotland (“Scotland’s Economy” 2018). The Scottish Government gained more trust in its handling of the economy, especially because its approach was distinct from the Westminster government’s response; soon after the recession, Scottish Labour’s support collapsed, and the SNP surged (Thompson 2018). Neither Ed Miliband nor Jeremy Corbyn has been able to regain Scotland’s support for the party (Thompson 2018). The surge in Scottish nationalism resulted in a SNP majority in Holyrood in 2011 (“Scotland’s Constitutional Timeline” 2008), further devolved powers to the Scottish Government, in 2012 and 2016 (“Devolution” 2019), and a referendum on Scottish independence in 2014 in which independence was rejected, 55.3% to 44.7% (Mullen 2014). In 2016, Scotland voted to stay in the European Union 62% to 38%, though the majority of the UK voted to leave (“EU Referendum Results” 2016).

Scotland has historically been Europhilic—“Scottish people are more used to dual identities” and the SNP, since the “independence in Europe” slogan, has promoted the EU as crucial to an independent, economically viable Scotland (Weber 2004). Scottish citizens receive more funding per person than the UK average (see figure 1). The EU encourages regional autonomy within its member-states (Molchanov 2005; McCann 2016) and Scotland is no exception. The EU also encourages civic nationalism (Nicolaidis 2004), one that unites Europeans in a belief in “modern civil liberties, rule of law and democracy” (Fligstein et al. 2012). Scottish nationalism also tends to be civic and inclusive; whereas English nationalism tends to be ethnic and clashes with EU civic nationalism, Scottish nationalism does not contradict the EU’s preferred form of nationalism (Hild 2016; Weber 2004). The civic tradition even influences who is excluded from Scottish nationalism—this exclusion tends to be for political, value-based reasons rather than ethnic ones. “If individuals are wont to feel themselves outside the nation in Scotland, it is more likely because of their political values than on account of their language or ancestry” (Henderson qtd in Weber 2004). Those who identify as Scottish are less likely to support sovereigntist narratives and are more likely to support international cooperation and transnational organisations like the EU (Richards et al. 2018).

Scotland favors a globalization that is inspired by small, social-democratic European states rather than the ultra-neoliberal Anglo-American globalization model (Scotland’s Economy 2013; Blockmans 2016; Molchanov 2005). The Brexit campaign and subsequent economic impacts of it, such as “the impact on the City (of London), [and] the collapse of sterling” were all “intensely Anglo-centric” and “lacking in the egalitarian principles so often attributed to the Scottish electorate” (McGarvey 2016). Compared to other British identities, “Scottish-only” identities were the least likely to want to stop budgetary commitments to the EU after Brexit and were the least keen on allowing the UK to pursue trade deals with countries outside the EU.
after Brexit (see table 1). Both of these factors are indicative of Scottish trust in European economic policies including ones that concern globalization, such as trade deals.

**Wales**

Welsh culture, history, and language is so distinct from the rest of the UK that scholars note that “there may be a Welsh nation, but there is not yet a Welsh state” (Morgan 1971). Wales did not retain its national institutions after its unification with England—the Union was, for the Welsh, more of an “absorption” than a partnership (Mears 1986). “Nationalism in Scotland was assisted and supported by the existence of specific political and government institutions of a separate nature” but “in Wales the Acts of Union of 1536 and 1542 specifically abolished all distinctive political, judicial and administrative bodies,” aiming to remove distinctions between England and Wales (Mears 1986). Like its Scottish counterpart, Welsh nationalism quickly gained traction once it gained a political element (Morgan 1971). This political element is typified in the formation of Plaid Cymru (the Party of Wales) in 1925: with an “appeal [that] was largely emotional and centred around the importance of the language and the literature of Wales,” Plaid Cymru gave Welsh nationalism the political framework it needed to become a macro-nationalism by Snyder’s parameters (Snyder qtd in Yun 1990). But Welsh nationalism also has aspects of mini-nationalism—its support for independence rather than devolution has been rare (but has drastically risen in recent decades). Even Plaid was originally formed as a party to conserve “the culture, language, traditions and economic life” of Wales and only later to secure independence (“Welsh Nationalist Party” 1970). Wales already had the strong ethnic and cultural forces required for macro-nationalism but did not have the drive for independence or independent national institutions that macro-nationalism requires (Mears 1986).

Plaid Cymru transitioned to an independence party in 1930, with the intention “to secure self government for Wales” (“Welsh Nationalist Party” 1970). But until 1960 it remained “primarily concerned with the protection of the Welsh language and electorally confined to the Welsh speaking areas of Wales” (Massetti 2015). As the decades progressed from 1930, the party began to also focus on economic inequality that severely disadvantaged Wales—but voters did not trust Plaid to handle the Welsh economy and instead voted for the Labour Party (Davies 1968). Plaid was seen by academics as only credible on culture and language issues, and was not even considered by the working class (Davies 1968). The 1950s saw Plaid “devote more energies and attention to contesting elections” but it was not seen as a “proper” political party until 1960, when it created a separate Welsh Language Society from the party (Massetti 2015). It did this to reconcile the “Welsh-speaking majority of its members who wanted political independence in order to preserve ‘the Welsh way of life’ and a minority (many of whom did not speak Welsh) who based their arguments on the alleged mismanagement and neglect of the Welsh economy by successive ‘English governments’” (Davies 1968). Plaid’s subsequent success in the 1966 election led to the Government to consider devolution, and the party’s continued success in 1970 further pressured the Government to devolve powers to Wales (Massetti 2015). Throughout the 1970s Plaid took advantage of the economic downturn, which harmed Wales more than England or Scotland (Miodownik 2006). “Unbalanced economic development” (Miodownik 2006) coupled with an unequal "cultural division of labor" (Hechter qtd in Miodownik 2006) led to
anti-Government, nationalist sentiment which would culminate in a referendum on devolution to Wales in 1979 (Massetti 2015). Wales rejected devolution with 20.3% voting in favor and 79.7% against (Duclos 2006). This overwhelming rejection was largely due to the unpopularity of James Callaghan’s Labour Party, who proposed the referendum (“Contemporary Wales 8” 1999). Throughout the eighties and nineties, Conservatives dominated the Westminster Government and the center-left electorate of Wales did not support their right-wing policies (Harvey 2014; Duclos 2006). Eighteen years under the Conservatives persuaded the Welsh of a “‘democratic deficit’ in Britain which only the creation of local assemblies could make good” (Duclos 2006). The Conservatives, especially under Margaret Thatcher, were quite hostile to devolution (Wyn Jones and Royles 2012). Accordingly, when the popular Labour Government under Blair came to power in 1997 and put devolution to the Welsh public again, this time there was a united pro-devolution campaign that narrowly won the vote, 50.3% to 49.7% (Duclos 2006).

Devolution established a National Assembly for Wales, but this Assembly had little power compared to the Scottish Parliament; it received “no tax powers and limited—that is to say, secondary—legislative authority” (Harvey 2014). This was due to the “Government of Wales Act 1998” which “limited the National Assembly to the making of secondary legislation in specified areas . . . such powers were broadly equivalent to those previously held by the Secretary of State for Wales” (“History of Welsh Devolution” 2019). The Assembly was run as a “single corporate body” which made it difficult for the minority Welsh Labour administration to govern; the Assembly in 2002 agreed to separate the Welsh Assembly Government (the Cabinet) from the National Assembly (“History of Welsh Devolution” 2019). This would not happen until the 2007 Assembly election when the parties passed the Government of Wales Act 2006 (“Government of Wales Act 2006” 2015). 2007 also saw Plaid join Labour in coalition government in the devolved assembly (Harvey 2014). The financial crash of 2008 impacted Wales more than most other parts of the UK—Wales was already the poorest country in the UK and the crash made this even worse (“Towards a Welsh Industrial Strategy” 2014). The negative effects on the Welsh economy were further intensified when the UK government unveiled austerity plans that unfairly targeted Wales (Wyn Jones and Royles 2012). Nationalistic sentiment rose in Wales so much that another referendum was held on further devolution in 2011, and its passing “led to the first primary law-making body in Wales since 1400” (McAngus 2014). In 2014 and 2017, further powers were devolved to the Welsh Assembly (“History of Welsh Devolution” 2019). But as other parts of the UK recovered economically and even flourished, Wales lagged behind, with its manufacturing output drastically diminished and its deficits at historically high levels (“Towards a Welsh Industrial Strategy” 2014). In 2016 Wales voted to leave the EU 52.5% to 47.5% (“EU Referendum Results” 2016).

Wales does not have the historical links with Europe that Scotland does, nor does it have the strong Anglo-American, anti-European sentiment of England; it falls in the middle of both countries. Welsh-speakers were “among the least likely groups in Wales to vote Leave (approx. 28% of fluent speakers)” (Larner 2019). But other strongly-Welsh identified people, especially in the south Wales Valleys, were likely to back Brexit (Scully 2017). Indeed, those who identify as Welsh-only have mixed views on Brexit (Heath and Richards 2018): they were the most likely to support equal rights for UK citizens in the EU but also were the most adamant that the EU
should have no role in UK lawmaking (see table 1). Welsh nationalism’s emphasis on language puts it firmly in the “ethnic” nationalism category, but Plaid’s de-emphasis of the language in favor of an inclusive, open Wales is indicative of civic nationalism (“Contemporary Wales 6” 1999). Welsh identities were not strongly indicative of sovereigntist narratives, but were also not enthusiastic about international cooperation (Richards et al. 2018). Brexit has reinvigorated a Welsh nationalism in Welsh Europhiles: an independent Wales could stay in the EU (Taylor 2019).

Wales has traditionally held center-left views economically and has a strong social-democratic tradition (Elliot et al. 2013; Scully 2017). This makes it more receptive to an EU-style form of globalization than neoliberal, Atlanticist England would be (Martell 2008; Molchanov 2005). But Wales blamed the EU for immigration and the loss of its main sectors, despite receiving EU funding to help with these problems (Scully 2017; Dickins 2017). This prevents Wales from being as Europhilic as Scotland. Welsh citizens receive the most funding per person from the EU of any country in the UK (see figure 1) but this did not prevent the Welsh from voting for Brexit, nor has it fixed Wales’s economic problems (Dickins 2017). Much of Wales has been “left behind” by globalization—its traditional role as a coal, steel and manufacturing hub has been upended by global economic forces (“Towards a Welsh Industrial Strategy” 2014; Scully 2017). The Welsh often view globalization negatively because it perpetuated “the decline in the industries which have traditionally sustained the Welsh economy” (Hywel et al. 2008). This economic shift and sustained decline influenced Wales to vote for Brexit (Scully 2017). Compared to other countries within the UK, the Welsh economy has “low productivity, household income and earnings” and has not adopted any radical reform: “there has not been a single, finely-targeted, big idea and that economic policy has not changed significantly since the 1990s” (Dickins 2017). But the Welsh view the trade and investment globalization brings positively and are still optimistic for their country’s economic future (Hywel et al. 2008).

Conclusion

Globalization and nationalism are closely related concepts in England, Scotland and Wales. Globalization has increased nationalism in these countries because globalization has increased the prominence and power of the EU and has also inspired devolution. England is in favor of American-style, neoliberal globalization but dislikes freedom of movement. Its belief in neoliberal globalization increased Euroskepticism within the country, with many English people preferring to leave the social-democratic EU which they viewed as impeding the enhancement of neoliberalism within England and diminishing England’s sovereignty. England’s preference for ethnic nationalism was in firm contrast to the civic nationalism espoused by the EU. England’s vote preference for “Leave” was higher than any other country in the UK; this was consistent with English nationalism and English globalization, which directly contradict European-style nationalism and globalization. England’s Brexit views and red-lines were driven by ethnic nationalism. Euroskepticism flourished further after devolution; England was the only country to not receive a devolved government, and the EU gave large amounts funding and support to the devolved territories. England espouses a macro-nationalism without having an English
independence party—this is because English nationalism focuses on independence from the EU rather than independence from the Union.

Scotland is in favor of an EU-style, social-democratic globalization. Scotland has historic ties to Europe, which make it receptive to European integration. Scottish nationalism is civic, just like the nationalism that the EU promotes. It is an inclusive sort of nationalism that emphasises Scottish values and institutions rather than language, culture or birth. Scotland voted by the highest percentage in the Union to stay in the EU, which is consistent with its beliefs in European-style nationalism and globalization. Devolution showed Scotland that it could govern itself as a social-democratic, European-style state, and events like the financial crash allowed the Scottish Government to put its preferred economic policies into practice. The SNP is a strongly Europhilic party that supports an independent Scotland in Europe. Scottish nationalism is a macro-nationalism; it emphasises independence and, unlike the nationalism of Yorkshire or Cornwall, is not a subset of a greater nationalism.

Wales, for each factor I considered (type of globalization, type of nationalism, the Brexit vote and amount of devolution), fell between the extremes of England and Scotland. Wales is in favor of social-democratic economics but has been “left behind” by globalization, so it does not fit neatly within the EU model or the Anglo-American model of globalization. Welsh nationalism has both ethnic and civic elements; the Welsh language is prioritised but the Welsh nationalist party Plaid Cymru also seeks to promote inclusivity in its nationalism. Wales has been economically disadvantaged both historically and in modern times; much of this disadvantage has been blamed on globalization, which caused Wales to lose its coal, steel and manufacturing industries. Even though the EU funds Wales the most per person, Wales still voted to leave the EU. The Welsh blamed the EU for immigration and the loss of its main industries. The amount of devolution Wales received was in between what Scotland received (ample) and what England received (nothing), and the Welsh drive for further devolution drove its nationalistic politics throughout the century. Welsh nationalism has aspects of mini-nationalism as its nationalism is strongly cultural and not always firmly pro-independence. But modern Welsh nationalism, led by Plaid tends to be macro-nationalism and firmly in favor of independence.

Bibliography

Agatstein et al. 2015. "And Be the Nation Again: A Consideration of the Scottish Nationalist Movement and Scottish National Party", College of Social Sciences and Humanities, Northeastern University.


“Contemporary Wales 6.” 1999. The Open University,


Nicolaïdis, Kalypso. 2004. “‘We, the Peoples of Europe …’” Foreign Affairs, 83(6), 97–110.


