

Bread Riots: Inquiry into Food Prices and Political Stability **Andrew Michels XAVIER UNIVERSITY**

Introduction

"You can't have peace when people are hungry" and "politics is expressed through people's stomachs" are sayings often attributed to political instability as a result of high food prices. The classic image of a bread riot from the French Revolution comes to mind when people were unable to afford even bread. The question now is: "Do these sayings have truth within them?" Specifically, are food prices related to political stability? Using data from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations and the World Bank, this study asses the relationship between food prices and political stability throughout the world using data between 2012 and 2014.

Hypothesis: As food prices increase, political stability decreases.

Research Question: Do food prices significantly affect political stability?

Research Design

The variable Food Prices is represented by the FAO's General Food Indices, which is a type of Consumer Price Index. CPI measures a change in prices since the year 2000. However, this measure can be influenced more by inflation than food security. Additionally, there is missing data for specific cases, thus the most recent data was used unless it was prior to 2012.

The variable Political Stability is defined as "capturing" perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism." This variable measures stability on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 is a complete lack of political stability and 100 is extreme political stability.

There are a few control variables to consider when measuring political stability: GDP per capita, Democracy Score, GINI Coefficient, and Confidence in Institutions. The controls may provide better correlations than food prices, which offer a new perspective on future studies.

A correlation and regression test finds that there is a negative correlation between Food Prices and Political Stability (R = -.136) and a significance of . 089; thus not a relatively strong relationship.

model. Additionally, Political Stability has a stronger correlation with GDP per Capita than Food Prices (R = .654), GINI Coefficient (R = -.280), and Democracy Score (R = .663).

As for these strong correlations, GDP per Capita and Democracy are significant (.070 and .000 respectively).

Results

Figure 1											
	Unstan d Coef	dardize ficients	Standa Coeffi	Sig.							
	В	Beta	В	Beta							
(Constant)	26.096	17.560		1.486	.143						
Food Prices	035	.019	144	-1.849	.070						
GDP per capita in 10K US\$	5.102	2.518	.212	2.026	.047						
Democracy Score	8.375	1.563	.557	5.357	.000						
GINI Coefficient	502	.272	138	-1.846	.070						
Confidence in Institution Scale	200	.127	112	-1.574	.121						

When looking at the correlation and regression tests for the new model (Food Prices-GDP per Capita-Democracy Score-GINI Coefficient-Confidence in Institutions), we find the model has R = .867. However, find there are mixed significances with each variable put into the new



Food Prices

Political St

GDP per in 10

Demo

GINI Coeff

Confide Instit

Despite rejecting the hypothesis, the inquiry has still provided insight into political stability. While food prices are not the major factor in stability, we have found that high GDP and strong democracies tend to have more stability (or lack of political violence). This finding has allowed us to pursue different economic measures (ie tax income) or look at different types of governments to see if political stability is affected. There are also several other World Governance Indicators to study, such as Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness. Perhaps the biggest limitation on this study was the absence of particular data points. Countries like Afghanistan were not represented due to certain conditions making it unfeasible to properly collect data. In future research, accessing different databases may assist in

*Cases where price >700 disincluded

Figure 3											
		Food Prices	Political Stability	GDP per capita in 10K US\$	Democracy Score	GINI Coefficient	Confidence in Institutions Scale				
S	Pearson Correlation	1	136	148	183*	.223*	153				
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.089	.097	.033	.011	.229				
	Ν	158	158	127	136	130	64				
tability	Pearson Correlation	136	1	.654**	.663**	280**	064				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.089		.000	.000	.000	.603				
	Ν	158	205	149	167	153	68				
capita ≺ US\$	Pearson Correlation	148	.654**	1	.586**	437**	.151				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.097	.000		.000	.000	.224				
	Ν	127	149	149	149	140	67				
ocracy Score	Pearson Correlation	183*	.663**	.586**	1	204*	081				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.033	.000	.000		.011	.509				
	Ν	136	167	149	167	153	68				
ficient	Pearson Correlation	223*	280**	437**	204*	1	091				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.011	.000	.000	.011		.464				
	Ν	130	153	140	153	153	67				
nce in utions Scale	Pearson Correlation	153	064	.151	081	091	1				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.229	.603	.224	.509	.464					
	Ν	64	68	67	68	67	68				

Discussion

closing those gaps in the dataset. Additionally, using new measures may produce a new outcome. For instance, CPI is a measure of change in price, not primarily a price an average person is paying. Thus, in a new study, we may also want to use change in GDP as a measure. What we may want to consider is creating case studies and study the effect of food prices in the short-term. Specifically, looking at the Arab Spring as way to predict political instability. Hopefully by continuing to study political stability, we can find policies that are more effective and easier to implement. On the other side of the spectrum, we are free to investigate other factors of food security to see whether or not food truly does play a role in political stability.