Leader Tenure and U.S. Intervention in Latin America

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In recent years Scholars working in the area of selectorate theory have devoted considerable attention to the topics of political survival and leader tenure. These studies have analysed the role of endogenous processes and foreign policies to explain the tenure of state leaders. This article examines how U.S. political, economic, and military intervention affected the political survival of state leaders in twenty-two Latin American states between 1961 and 2001. Contrary to expectations, this study finds no evidence that U.S. intervention is associated with longer tenure for state leaders in Latin America.

On 25 February 1990 the incumbent President of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, was defeated by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. Ortega's defeat was a surprise, given the popularity of the incumbent and his party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front [FSLN]. Although the outcome was a shock for many, there were several factors that contributed to Ortega's defeat, including: a struggling economy and an extended internal war. In addition many observers argued that U.S. involvement was a pivotal factor in the elections.[1] The United States government supported the counterrevolutionaries fighting against the Sandinista government and lent the weight of their political and economic support to the challenger candidate – going as far as to promise to end the war if Ortega was defeated in the elections (M. Lester, personal communication, October 14, 2011). Ultimately these factors led to Ortega losing the 1990 presidential elections in Nicaragua.

Ortega's defeat is just one of many examples of U.S. involvement in Latin American politics. Ever since the Monroe Doctrine was declared on December 2, 1823, the United States has taken a strong interest in the political, economic, and military affairs in Latin America. America's interest in Latin America increased during the Cold War, as the U.S. viewed its national security as inextricably linked to the containment of communism (Yoon, 1997: 581). Indeed, according to F.O. Mora:

> The United States worked to further its interests in the region by involving itself in the internal processes of states within Latin America: "In the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. has been the most dominant power this century, often intervening in the internal affairs of many countries in the region, particularly in the Caribbean Basin" (1998: 60).

Traditionally, U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of third world states has been used to stabilize or destabilize particular state leaders (Miller and Toritsyn, 2005: 360). The U.S. has a long history of propping up unpopular regimes and destabilizing popularly elected leaders throughout the world. This study examines how U.S. foreign policy actions affected the political survival of Latin American leaders. It is expected that leaders of states in Latin America will be subject to U.S. policy whims and can ensure their continued survival in office by implementing policies which have the approval of the United States. Accordingly, I hypothesize that if the U.S. supports a Latin American state leader, that leader will survive in office longer than if the U.S. had been neutral. An analysis of the impact of U.S. support of Latin America leaders between

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[1] See, for example, Robinson (1992), who argued that, "Massive foreign interference completely distorted an endogenous political process and undermined the ability of the elections to be a free choice regarding the destiny of the country. U.S. intervention undercut the Nicaraguan people's right to exercise self-determination" (150).

1961 and 2001 finds that U.S. support was not associated with longer length of tenure for the leader's regime.

Literature Review

In the field of international relations, proponents of the Realist school of thought assert that the international system is anarchic and states must fend for themselves. Writing centuries ago Thucydides stated, "Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (1996: 352) Applying this statement to the modern world system, which has states as the main actors, means that powerful states are able to act as they see fit and weak states must cope with the consequences.

Since the advent of the United Nations, exercising power rarely means going to outright war with a weaker state but rather using one's power and influence to manipulate the weaker states internal policies towards a more favorable position. Pressure from the powerful state then causes the weaker state to grant policy concessions to ensure favorable policies from the powerful state. Leaders of weak states often grant policy concessions in return for assistance in economic, political, and military forms which will be used to stabilize the targeted regime (Mesquita and Smith, 2007: 254). If a leader does not grant policy concessions to the powerful state, then the powerful state will attempt to bring in a leader that is more receptive to their policy goals.

Political Survival and Selectorate Theory

The literature on political survival explicitly addresses many of the areas mentioned above, and is thus a rich field with important implications for the purpose of this article. With the release of the book *The Logic of Political Survival,* Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003) introduced selectorate theory to the literature of political survival. Selectorate theory asserts that leader survival is determined by the selectorate and the winning coalition. The winning coalition is the set of people supporting the leader from the selectorate and the selectorate is the group of people who have "a potential say in who is to be leader" (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2007: 255). A leader stays in power by ensuring loyalty from members of the winning coalition. If enough members of the winning coalition defect to an opposition challenger, then the leader will lose office. In democracies the selectorate and winning coalition are both large, and in autocracies the selectorate is large but the winning coalition is small (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Both the size of the selectorate and winning coalition affect how leaders in different situations attempt to maintain their office. The selectorate theory is also based on three main assumptions, namely: that politics is competitive, the primary goal of political leaders is to stay in power, and political opponents are willing to pay a price to remove a leader (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). These assumptions along with the concepts of the selectorate and winning coalition provide the basis for selectorate theory.

According to selectorate theory political leaders are most concerned with staying in power and leader longevity depends, in part, on internal factors such as economic growth, the amount of time the leader has already been in office, regime type, political unrest, and interstate and intrastate conflict (Beuno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Biene and van de Walle, 1991; Londegran and Poole, 1990; Chiozza and Goemans, 2004). State leaders attempt to control these factors and increase their time in office. Snider (2005) found economic conditions were not a significant factor in leader tenure. Snider argues this occurs because the state leader merely needs to satisfy those within her winning coalition and not the whole selectorate. In autocracies this leads to an increase in private goods at the expense of public goods. Those within the winning coalition will be significantly better off because of the fewer number of members within the winning coalition

when compared to the selectorate. By doing this fewer resources are available to promote economic growth and the economy suffers.

According to selectorate theory, there are three main threats to political survival that a leader needs to guard against: opposition challengers, mass movements, and external enemies (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009). A leader is able to stay in power longer if she is able to protect against these three threats. For states in the Third World, internal forces are the most pressing threat to both national security and leader survival because many states in this region are not well consolidated and do not have the legitimacy enjoyed by First World states. The greatest security threat to Third World states is from domestic forces seeking to change the political system or take control of the government (Ayoob, 1983). There are various means of protecting against internal threats, including institutionalization, policy concessions, diversions, and alignment with a foreign power (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2007; R. Miller and Elgün, 2011; E. Miller and Toritsyn, 2005). Though their effectiveness remains the subject of debate, these measures do provide state leaders with a set of political options.

This study relies on the existing literature as a basis for the research design, but departs from selectorate theory by shifting focus away from leaders' efforts to hold on to power. This study will elide the question of how leaders respond to threats and instead consider how political survival is affected by an external actor, namely the United States.

Statecraft

The literature on economic and political statecraft also has important ramifications for this study. Determining whether the U.S. supports or does not support a state leader comes down to how U.S. policies are interpreted. This is largely the realm of statecraft. One important aspect of statecraft that is particularly important is the use of military forces for political purposes. Blechman and Kaplan (1979) describe how the U.S. has used the armed forces for nonmilitary political purposes since the end of World War II. The authors find that although military forces are often used to show support for allies or intimidate rivals, the effects of military displays are short-lived because once forces are withdrawn, the consequences of resisting U.S. policies diminish. Diplomatic and political statements are also forms of statecraft. Similar to the use of military forces for political purposes, diplomatic statements do not sway the policies of targeted states in any significant manner unless they are also supported by other more costly action (Walsh, 2007).

In addition to military action and diplomatic statements, the United States and other nations also use economic assistance or sanctions to influence the policies of weaker states. Economic assistance and sanctions are more effective because the health of third world economies often depend substantially on trade or economic assistance from the first world. In a recent study, Licht (2010) argues the foreign policy of wealthy and powerful states is designed to reward, support, or entice cooperation from smaller states. In the literature there is debate over whether economic sanctions are effective. Marinov (2005) found sanctions are effective at least in destabilizing the leader of the state that is targeted. Sanctions negatively affect the economy of the targeted state and make the leader more likely to lose power. Conversely, Lektzian and Sprecher (2007) argue economic sanctions are ineffective because they do not have much cost to sanctioning state and so do not do much harm to the targeted state.

In contrast to sanctions, economic assistance is designed to support or influence the states it targets. It is assumed that donor states expect policy concessions from recipient states in return for aid. The receiving state will accept these policy concessions if the leader of the state benefits from the deal (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2007). In different circumstances, aid will have differing levels of effectiveness. Blanchard and Ripsman (2008) assert that the effectiveness of economic statecraft depends upon the "stateness" of the target state. Stateness is defined through the three

components of decision-making autonomy, economic and coercive capacities, and legitimacy. The less "stateness" a target state has, the more effective aid will be in leveraging policy concessions.

Foreign aid is largely dependent upon the foreign policy interests of the donating states. Since the end of the Cold War the amount of foreign assistance the U.S. gives out had decreased markedly. The decline in U.S. foreign aid is the result of changes in U.S. foreign policy following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the threat of communism (Lai, 2003). Though foreign aid has different purposes than during the Cold War, there is considerable evidence that it remains an important foreign policy tool (Lai, 2003).

The literature on foreign policy signaling also aids in understanding what policies are effective in influencing internal policies of third world states. Foreign policy signaling is based on the fact that it is impossible to know the true intentions of a state's policies. To combat the problem of ambiguity, states must send costly signals so that their actions are taken seriously (Lektzian and Sprecher, 2007). In fact, states give more weight to diplomatic communications when the signals sent have a significant political or financial cost, such as a troop movement or an ultimatum.

In an anarchical international system, costly signals are more reliable indicators of a state's preferences than cheap signals (Trager, 2010). Thyne (2010), for example, shows that opposition groups are more likely to respond to policies from the United States if the policies have a large financial or diplomatic cost to the U.S. In a similar study, Walsh (2007) finds that foreign policy signals sent by Gorbachev to indicate reduced tensions between the U.S. and the USSR were only effective when they were costly.

For the purposes of this study, understanding if a signal from the U.S. is sincere or is meant for some other purpose is a critical factor in assessing the level of U.S. support for state leaders in Latin America. A diplomatic statement that condemns a leader for human rights abuses and an economic aid package to that same leader would make U.S. support for this leader ambiguous if the costs of the signals is not taken into account. Recognizing that some types of signals are better indicators of support than others is an important step in measuring U.S. support.

Intervention

Two questions that arise when trying to quantify U.S. support for a state leader, is what constitutes normal interaction between states and when is the relationship being manipulated by the U.S. at the expense of the weaker state. It would be difficult to argue that all interactions between states are for manipulative purposes given that a cornerstone of liberal theory is that trade and cooperation between states can be beneficial to both sides. To this end, the literature on intervention helps distinguish between normal interactions between states and state-to-state manipulation.

The literature on intervention suffers from a serious flaw in that there is no clear, agreed upon definition of intervention. As a result, intervention is often used as a catchall term with no fixed meaning (Rosenau, 1969; Yoon, 1997: 585). In response to the need for a clear definition of the term, Rosenau proposes that intervention be defined as "convention-breaking behavior directed at foreign authority structures" (1969: 165). With an explicit definition of what the basis of intervention is, specific forms of intervention can be examined.

Some types of intervention include verbal statements, economic assistance, withholding economic assistance, deployment of combat personnel, and military engagement (Yoon, 1997: 585). During the Cold War, for instance, the U.S. intervened in ways large and small in a number of internal wars that took place in third world countries. In these cases, the United States intervention was based on its perception that otherwise internal Latin American affairs were, in fact, part of a global struggle between pro-communist and anti-communist forces (Lagon, 1992). Another factor is that states are generally more concerned with political events that take place in states that are geographically close; as a result, intervention is more likely to involve neighboring

states than states which are far away (Yoon, 1997: 582). Thus, the proximity of Latin American nations to the United States contributed to routine U.S. intervention in Latin America during the Cold War (Mora, 1998: 60).

Though U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs is evident, its effectiveness remainsa matter of debate. Thyne (2010) observes U.S. foreign policy signals lead to or prevent coups from occurring in Latin America. When the U.S. approves of a foreign government, they often send signals in the form of financial assistance, increased levels of trade, and formal alliances. These positive signals reinforce the existing government whereas negative signals can possibly destabilize a foreign government. Often when the U.S. does not support a regime, especially during the Cold War, they would support opposition groups attempting to overthrow the government (Lagon, 1992). Mora (1998) argues that although foreign intervention does have a significant effect on the internal policies of states, regime change is still largely determined by domestic groups, not the United States.

Gap in the Literature

There is an abundance of literature concerning political survival and the effects of selectorate theory on foreign aid, policy concessions, economic sanctions, war, and political institutions. This scholarship tends to focus on how the leaders of states act to ensure their survival in office and the internal factors that affect political survival. U.S. intervention and foreign policy interests during the Cold War also occupy a prominent space in the literature. Many of these articles focus on how containing communism was the primary factor determining foreign policy decisions during the Cold War and the change that has occurred since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Economic statecraft, foreign policy signaling, and U.S. hegemony also have a significant place in the scholarly literature. Despite the attention paid to these subjects, there is an absence of literature that combines these intersecting subjects into a single research design. Accordingly, this study examines the political, military, and economic means by which the United States projects its power abroad and how U.S. actions affect the survival of foreign leaders. In contrast to previous studies, which have generally sought to understand the internal strategies of foreign leaders, this study focuses on the impact of a powerful external force – U.S. pressure – on leader tenure.

Research Design

A quantitative method research design will be used to test the hypothesis. For the purposes of this study, the cases will be limited to independent states in Latin America with more than one million inhabitants. Selecting the states of Latin America allows for the comparison of states with similar cultural, political, and economic systems, and a shared history of colonization. This group of geographically close states is chosen over a random selection of third world states because the random selection makes it difficult to control for several key intervening variables that are likely to impact leader tenure. Latin American states are also chosen because they have historically been very dependent upon the United States for economic, military, and political support. This dependence upon the U.S., along with their geographic proximity, should maximize the effect that U.S. support or opposition for a state leader has upon the political survival of that leader (Yoon, 1997). The years in which these cases are to be analyzed are 1961-2001, which contain both Cold War and post-Cold War periods, and the data necessary is easily available.

Key Variables

The independent variable in this study is U.S. support which can be shown through political, economic, and military policies. U.S. support will be evaluated by measuring U.S. economic assistance, the amount of U.S. troops stationed in the state, and military aid. Economic assistance is

measured in two ways: U.S. assistance per year in constant 2010 U.S. dollars and as a percentage change of the assistance given from the year before. This is done because assistance is very dependent upon the amount aid that was given the year before (Lai, 2003: 106). A large amount of economic assistance may be a remnant from a previous leader and does not properly signal the support of the U.S. for the current leader. Total economic assistance per year will also be included because once a leader is in power the amount of aid is expected to remain relatively static. If only the percentage change of aid per year was measured this could miss a state leader who received a large increase in aid when she first took office but then the amount of aid was relatively static because her state was already receiving large amounts of aid.

U.S. military support for a state can be measured by the number of U.S. troops stationed in the state and the amount of military aid. Military aid is measured in two ways: U.S. assistance per year in constant 2010 U.S. dollars and as a percentage change of the assistance given from the year before. The data for economic and military aid is from the United States Agency for International Development. The amount of U.S. troops stationed in a state is an indicator of U.S. support because a state that is hostile to the United States would not wish to have U.S. troops stationed on its soil (Blechman and Kaplan, 1979). Also the U.S. would not want to put its troops in danger by having them in a state where the U.S. is not on good terms with the other government. In this way having U.S. troops in a foreign state is an indicator of support for that state and its leader, unless the U.S. is waging war against the other state. U.S. troops will simply be measured by the number of people that are stationed in the foreign state in an official military role. This data was retrieved from the Heritage Foundation. These measures are indicative of U.S. support because, as discussed in the literature review, these signals are costly in some way to the United States and therefore are representative of the actual views and interests of the U.S. state (Lektzian and Sprecher, 2007). These measures assume that U.S. support or opposition is directed towards the leader of the state rather than for some other purpose.

The dependent variable in this study is leader tenure. Leader tenure is measured by the amount of time a certain leader is office, with years as the unit of measure. Years are used because most of the data concerning economic indicators are compiled annually. One difficulty with this measure is defining who the leader of the state is (Bienen and van de Walle, 1991). In democracies this is not especially vexing because the state leader is popularly elected (whether the elections are fair and free is a different matter), and takes office upon receiving a certain percentage of the votes. In autocracies defining the leader of the state is sometimes less precise. There could be a ceremonial post of president which someone is appointed or elected to but does not have the power to dictate the policies the state will pursue. Another problem that occurs with measuring the amount of time a leader is in office is how to account for natural death or term limits in democracies. The natural death of a state leader is problematic because the leader leaves office despite still having the support necessary to remain in office. Term limits pose a similar problem to natural death. A leader is forced out of office due to constitutional limits that do not reflect the will of the people. Since a Chi-Square is used for the statistical analysis in this study, the issues of natural deaths and term limits become flaws that could be resolved in a study that uses a more advanced statistical technique, such as survival analysis.

In addition to the independent variables there are several other variables that could affect the political survival of state leaders. The aim of these additional variables is to measure the risk to political survival from internal factors. The variables used to measure this are the amount of time the leader has already been in office, economic growth, regime type, and political unrest in the form of interstate or intrastate conflict. The amount of time a leader has already been in office is an important variable to account for because as mentioned in the literature review past time in office has an effect upon the amount of time the leader will likely remain in office (Bienen and van de Walle, 1991; Quiroz-Flores, 2009). Current amount of time in office is also related to

regime type. For authoritarian leaders the longer they have been in office the longer they are likely to stay in office whereas for democratic leaders the longer they have been in office the more likely they are to lose office (Goemans, 2000). Leader tenure is also expected to be shorter in democracies because leaders are subject to regular checks on power in the form of elections. Autocrats do not have these checks on power by the population so they are expected to stay in office longer since the threats to their political survival come from opposition challengers are extremely lessened.

Another measure of internal stability is the amount of economic growth. Economic growth is important to citizens since it leads to better living conditions for them and their families. Large economic growth will mean more, higher paying jobs and a better ability of the citizens to be able to survive and prosper. In contrast, if economic growth is extremely low or nonexistent there is likely to be high unemployment, and citizens will have trouble purchasing basic necessities for their families and themselves. Economic growth per year is used instead of an absolute measure like gross domestic product or gross national income because these absolute measures are characteristics of the state at a certain point in time (Marinov, 2005; Londegran and Poole, 1990). Economic growth is expected since it shows the government is working to help the citizens and in the future the citizens should have a better quality of life on average. If economic growth is stifled this hope probably will not exist and the population will want a change in the leader of the state.

The last control variable used is the presence of interstate or intrastate conflict. Political unrest is defined by the existence of riots, protests, revolutionary movements, strikes, and other political movements that organize a segment of the population against the government or some government policy (Londegran and Poole, 1990; Bienen and van de Walle, 1991). Political unrest undermines the internal stability of a leader because the population is expressing its discontent with the current government, of which the leader is the most recognizable symbol. The absence of political unrest indicates, at least on the surface, a stable environment for the leader. Intrastate and interstate conflicts also represent a significant threat to the political survival of the leader (Beuno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Goemans, 2000). An intrastate conflict demonstrates that a sizable portion of the state is dissatisfied enough with the government to declare war or to attempt and secede from the state. Interstate conflict threatens the leader survival from external forces and also often causes immense damage to the civilian population of the state. These variables combined are used to indicate the internal stability of a state leader and the threat she faces of replacement form forces within her own state. Providing a measure for the internal threat to leader survival is important for this study because it provides a baseline of what probably would have happened if the U.S. had not intervened. Having this baseline is crucial since the hypothesis is based upon how U.S. support or opposition affects what should be a largely endogenous process; the tenure of the state leader.

Findings

A chi-square test was used to analyze the relationship between U.S. support and leader tenure. An ordinal level variable, ranging from zero to eight, was created to measure U.S. economic and military support, with zero to two being the lowest level of support, three to five being medium support, and six to eight being the highest level of support. Additionally, leader tenure was divided into three categories as well with less than two years in office being short tenure, between two and five years in office being medium tenure, and with more than five years in office being long tenure. Regime type was also split into three categories and was used as a conditional variable.

The findings from the chi-square test are displayed in Table 1. The test shows no statistical support for the hypothesis. Moreover, none of the relationships have a statistically significant p-value, indicating a lack of support for the hypothesis.

Table 1: Chi-Square Tests

Regime Type (3 Categories)		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Autocracy	Pearson Chi-Square	5.163[a]	4	.271
	Likelihood Ratio	4.939	4	.294
	Linear-by-Linear Association	1.269	1	.260
	N of Valid Cases	39		
Mixed Regime	Pearson Chi-Square	5.384[b]	4	.250
	Likelihood Ratio	7.040	4	.134
	Linear-by-Linear Association	3.940	1	.047
	N of Valid Cases	100		
Democracy	Pearson Chi-Square	4.877[c]	4	.300
	Likelihood Ratio	4.754	4	.313
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.559	1	.455
	N of Valid Cases	120		
Total	Pearson Chi-Square	4.059[d]	4	.398
	Likelihood Ratio	4.063	4	.398
	Linear-by-Linear Association	1.107	1	.293
	N of Valid Cases	259		

a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.31.
b. 3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.40.
c. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.53.
d. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.55.

Given the lack of statistical evidence to support the hypothesis, it appears U.S. support for a leader of Latin American state neither increased, nor decreased, the length of tenure of Latin American leaders during this period. This finding is surprising given the amount of anecdotal evidence from which the hypothesis was derived. It may be that previous scholars have overemphasized the role of the United States based on its influence in a few select cases. Based on the evidence presented here, it appears that at least with regard to leader tenure, the impact of the U.S. on the internal politics of Latin American states is actually quite limited.

Conclusion

The results of the Chi-Square test indicate that U.S. support is not significantly correlated with leader survival in Latin America. In other words, more U.S. support does not lead to a longer time in office for a specific leader. A brief review of events throughout the history of Latin America makes these results surprising. It is commonly believed that U.S. opposition to Arbenz in Guatemala and Allende in Chile led to their overthrows and U.S. support for Somoza in Nicaragua, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, and Stroessner in Paraguay kept these leaders in power for a large period of time. Despite these examples, there are cases that are not as predicted such as Castro in Cuba and Chavez in Venezuela. Both leaders were or have been in power for large amounts of time despite significant and vocal U.S. opposition to their regimes. In fact there have been notable coup attempts organized by the U.S. against both Castro and Chavez. It appears to be that these cases are more the norm than exceptions to a rule.

Although the research design does measure U.S. support and leader tenure in a fairly accurate manner, there are some shortcomings with the design which is inevitable in any social science research. As noted previously, one major concern is how to code cases in which the U.S. was neutral. Looking back at the hypothesis of the article, if the U.S. supports a foreign state leader, than that leader would survive in office longer than if the U.S. had been neutral; this raises the question of what happens if the U.S. had been neutral. Obviously, proving beyond a doubt when the leader would have been removed from office if the U.S. had been neutral is an impossible task. The best alternative is to try to determine the forces other than U.S. support which factor into the political survival of a leader in Latin America. This is the purpose of the control variables described above. The control variables attempt to show the amount of risk to the political survival of a state leader solely from internal forces. Then factoring U.S. support or opposition leads to the determination of whether or not a leader will remain or be removed from office. Unfortunately, this neat dichotomy that is proposed in the study does not reflect what actually happens in the world. Internal factors affect external factors and external factors affect internal factors; they cannot simply be separated like variables in a mathematical equation due to their entangled nature. Given this complexity, there is still a need to study this phenomenon of U.S. support or opposition affecting the political survival of leaders in Latin America.

It should also be noted that in this study relatively few variables are used to measure U.S. support. A more comprehensive study could take into account other measures such as diplomatic statements, the presence of sanctions, treaties negotiated, and support for opposition groups. Additionally, the number of variables used to measure the internal stability could be expanded as well to give a more comprehensive picture of the internal factors that affect the political survival in states. Introducing more variables in this way would allow a more complete depiction of the cases analyzed, and thus, improve the study. Fewer variables are used in this design given the scope of the study, which hurts the overall effectiveness in describing the situations at hand. Despite these drawbacks of the research design, the study does provide a reasonably persuasive explanation for why the measures stand for the variables they are supposed to be representing. Future research into this area is needed to incorporate more variables, possibly through the use of survival analysis or other, more sophisticated statistical techniques.

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