David Oughton's summary of

How to Think about War and Peace by Mortimer J. Adler

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Preface, pp. xix-xxiii

Adler begins by saying that he was never taught about war and peace in his own education. He also admits that for many years he failed as a teacher of political philosophy to give his students the fundamental insights about war and peace which everyone should possess. He then says that World War II aroused him from neglect on this matter. (This book was written during the summer of 1943.)

Adler states that this book tries to expound the basic notions which everyone must use to think clearly about war and peace. He says that this book differs from most current books about peace in that it is primarily concerned with the ideas which everyone should use and not with the plans which deserve a place at the peace table. It is not a book about how to make peace after the Second World War is over or about what should be done at the postwar peace conference. It is a book about "how to think about war and peace" until peace is finally made.

Part One: THE PROBLEM OF PEACE: Chapters 1 and 2

Chapter 1: "The Questions Men Must Face," pp. 3-7

Here are the six questions which Adler says everyone must face:

1. Will there be a world war after this one?
2. If so, will it occur in my lifetime or in the lifetime of my children and grandchildren?
3. If there is to be another world war, what can we do to postpone it?
4. Will there ever be peace on earth--not just a breathing spell between wars, but a lasting peace?
5. If so, will it come in my lifetime, in my grandchildren's, or centuries from now?
6. If there is any probability of perpetual peace, what can we do to hasten its coming?

Most people throughout history have never approached the problem of war and peace by asking themselves these questions. Throughout the ages, people have assumed that there would be another war, either in their own lifetime or in their children's lifetime. Believing that future wars were inevitable, rulers and representatives have only been concerned with the time, place, and the alignment of armed forces.

For most of recorded history, individuals have tried to achieve peace within themselves but political peace between political communities remained a hopeless ideal. It was universally assumed for centuries that perpetual peace was impossible. Only in the last four centuries have a few people

proposed practical means for making institutionalized changes that would promote political peace. Only during this century have more and more people considered both the possibility and probability of lasting peace.

Chapter 2: "The Answers Men Have Given," pp. 8-23

There are two general patterns in thinking about war and peace: that of the optimist and that of the pessimist.

According to the pessimist position, future wars, including world wars, are inevitable. Pessimists hold that the only practical goal is prolonging peace in our time or postponing the next world war. The only means available are the devices of power politics: treaties, alliances, or coalitions, aiming at a balance or a predominance of military power. A league of nations, world courts for arbitration or international disputes, and other international agencies can supplement alliances but they cannot be considered adequate by themselves to postpone or prevent the next world war. The pessimist does not deny that world government could abolish international wars. But the pessimist insists that any scheme which goes beyond a confederacy or league of independent nations is at present out of the question because it requires a change in national independence and sovereignty.

The optimist, however, believes that international wars, both local and worldwide, can be prevented. The optimist holds that perpetual peace is not the only goal for which we <u>can</u> work but it is the only goal for which we <u>should</u> work. According to the optimist, no form of power politics and no merely international organization are adequate either for initiating or preserving world peace. Therefore, we must establish a federal world government which is constitutional rather than despotic; which is built upon the principles of political justice and liberty for all peoples; and which is accomplished by voluntary acts of union on the part of all the states to be federated, not by conquest or imperialism. The consistent optimist realizes that federated states retain none of their <u>external</u> sovereignty and that world government requires the complete abolition of national independence. The optimist believes that the pessimist falsely confuses peace with a truce or a mere absence of shooting. According to the optimist, pessimists promise peace when what they really mean is the maintenance of large military establishments to safeguard a tenuous truce.

The "extreme pessimists" and "the befuddled optimists" have no basis for agreement but the "liberal" pessimists and the "clearsighted" optimists do agree on certain fundamentals. The liberal pessimist tries to combine power politics with international morality. The clearsighted optimist denies that international morality without supranational government will work. But neither is an isolationist because neither thinks that the next world war can be effectively postponed or prevented by an effort on the part of his/her nation, or any single nation, to keep out of world affairs. Neither is a militarist because neither admires war as a noble enterprise fulfilling the human spirit. Both feel that the prevention of war to any degree, temporarily or permanently, is an unqualified good. Furthermore, neither is a pacifist because neither is satisfied that a widespread desire to avoid war is sufficient to postpone it, much less to abolish it entirely. Both think that absolute pacifism is impractical.

What both the liberal pessimist and the clear-sighted optimist agree on is that "power is needed to prevent war or to maintain peace." (p. 21) Both agree that there are only two alternatives: (1) either independent nations, separately or in coalition, must exercise the ultimate power in world affairs, or (2) that power must be wielded by a single world government to which all peoples are equally subject. Their difference lies in the fact that pessimists choose the first horn of the dilemma while optimists choose the second horn. The optimist Adler rejects the pessimist position because he argues that a revitalized league of independent nation-states (including the later United Nations), with its covenants and conventions of international law, can never be any stronger than the obligations which nations are willing to fulfill or than the pledges which the might of a predominant alliance (great powers) can force unwilling nations to respect. The optimist proposes to revive a league of nations only to transform it from a conference of self-governing nations into a government of federated states. The optimist Adler concludes that "a monopoly of power offers the only solid ground for any practical solution of the problem of war and peace." (pp. 22-23)

Part Two: THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACE: Chapters 3-13

Chapter 3: 'The Inevitability of War," pp. 27- 31

During the last 2.500 years, people have lived with the belief that war is inevitable. The average family has not survived three generations without some of its members being directly engaged in war. Because there always have been wars, must there always be wars?

In the history of medicine, many diseases thought to be incurable have been cured. We have learned that they were never incurable in the first place. The discovery of our error in thinking the "merely uncured" to be "incurable" gives us confidence that other diseases still uncured win turn out to be curable as medical science progresses. However, death is not curable. Is war like disease, or is it like death? Adler answers that war is intrinsically curable though still uncured.

Many centuries of human history had chattel slavery as a basic social and economic institution. We know that it can be abolished. For the most part, it has been abolished in most parts of the world. However, if we were living in the eighteenth century, we would assume that slavery would always exist. For Aristotle, the Roman jurists, Christian theologians, and the American constitutionalists, slavery was considered an institution inseparable from the fabric of human society. It was simply assumed that some people are by nature slaves and fit only to be used as instruments. They did not realize that the "slavish appearance" of some people resulted from the way in which they had been treated, not from the nature with which they were born. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the abolitionist movements tried to reverse these unquestioned assumptions.

Is war like chattel slavery? Is it a curable social disease? The answer is "yes" if it can be shown that war is essentially abnormal and a violation rather than a fulfillment of human nature. Adler argues that "we cannot rightly think that war is normal merely because it has always plagued the social life of humans." (p. 31)

Chapter 4: "The Abnormality of War," pp. 32-43

The first question to be answered is whether the political nature of humans makes peace the normal condition, and war the abnormal condition. Up to the present time, people living in social groups have always had to resort to fighting to settle their differences. There have always been wars between organized groups of humans, whether the level of social organization was that of the tribe or village, city-state, empire, or nation.

The word "war" should not be used for every kind of violent conflict between humans. Criminals, individually or in gangs, resort to violence but every sort of violence is not war. War refers to "violent conflict between separate communities." (p. 33)

It should not be forgotten that just as there have been many wars, there have also been as many "peaces" as there have been relatively stable social organizations. Each peace, though, has been local among the members of a given community.

Neither the wars nor the peaces which the world has known have been continuous. Wars between communities have been interrupted by truces--by the end or hostilities which we sometimes call "international peace." The civil peaces of most historic communities have also been broken by revolution or some other kind of civil strife.

From all of this, Adler concludes that since people can and do live at peace with one another under certain conditions, wars do not flow from the very nature of humanity. For if by human nature each human could live in no other way than at war with his/her other humans, then local peace would never have existed anywhere in the world. However, we find people living at peace everywhere in the world and at all times. Even during a world war, people can live in peace with the members of their own community.

The "state of war" which Thomas Hobbes described as the "natural" condition of humanity has never existed on earth so far as individual humans are concerned. There has never been "the war of all against all" because humans are not by nature solitary beasts. Humans have always lived together in societies. The war of each against every other has never occurred among humans as it does occur in the jungle among the solitary beasts of prey. People have been able to live in peace under the conditions provided by an organized society.

If war is not required by human nature, then why have there always been wars in the past? The answer, according to Adler, is that people have so far failed to establish the social organization identical with total peace, even though they have been able to institute the social organizations identical with local peaces. The fact the people know how to make local peace shows that they know how to make total peace

The fact that enabled some people to understand the possibility of abolishing slavery was the fact that freedom had always coexisted with slavery. Likewise, what has enabled some people to understand the possibility of abolishing war is the fact that peace has always coexisted with war. Freedom and peace correspond to the deepest aspirations of human nature. The fact that humans are by nature <u>rational</u> makes slavery repugnant; the fact that humans are by nature <u>political</u> makes war abnormal.

Humans form political communities in order to have peace, in order to live without violence, and in order to enjoy the positive benefits which peace provides. Peace, which is identical with the order of civil life, represents the normal condition. War, identical with the absence of civil order, violates and frustrates human nature. That is why war is abnormal! The abnormality of war is in no way lessened by the distinction between good and bad wars, just and unjust wars. All wars violate the nature of humanity and defeat humanity's normal aspiration for the goods of social life.

Why is it that most of the great political philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, and Kant) held that although war is abnormal, it could not be eliminated from human affairs? The answer is that none of these men were in a position to imagine the development of a world political community. Such historic limitations prevented most people, even most enlightened philosophers, from seeing that war can be eliminated.

Chapter 5: "What Peace Is," pp. 44 – 54

By the very nature of the nation-state system, each nation-state is a power to the extent that it has the capacity for war. Nation-states are always in a "state of war," which becomes actual warfare when the shooting begins. During the period of truce or "no-shooting," nations defend themselves and prepare for warfare, not only through their military establishments but also through treaties and alliances.

We must distinguish two different kinds of peace and two different kinds of war. "Internal peace" obtains within any political community. It is sometimes called "civil peace." "External peace" is the peace which obtains between distinct political communities, nations, or states. It is sometimes called "international peace." Between nations there is always potential war when there is not actual fighting. Adler uses quotation marks around "external peace" to indicate that it can only signify a truce.

"External war" is war between distinct political communities. It is sometimes called "international war" in the modern era. "Internal war" 1s war within a single political community. It is often called "civil war," "rebellion," "revolution," or "civil strife."

Adler uses the words "war" and "truce" to describe the relationship between distinct political communities. He uses the words "peace" and "civil war" to describe the relationship between people within a single political community.

While individual peace is the result of virtue and charity, social peace is primarily the result of political institutions, justice, and law. Social peace occurs when people live together in relative harmony and enjoy the tranquility of order. Social peace consists in making a "one" out of a "many." The maxim "e pluribus unum" defines social peace.

A community of persons implies a "common unity." Domestic peace does not consist in the total absence of fighting or quarreling within the family. It does not require all members of the household to agree about everything. As long as the family members have a way of settling disagreements and a way of patching up quarrels, they will continue to enjoy the benefits of peaceful association as they continue to cooperate for the family's good. Domestic peace is broken only when the family breaks

up into feuding clans, each with its own common purpose and each having antagonism against the other portion.

The peace of a family does not differ essentially from the peace of a village. The same thing is true for all the other varieties of communities. Adler stresses that the characteristics of peace are everywhere the same.

Chapter 6: "How Peace Is Made," pp. 55 -68

For Adler, the cause of peace is government. The effective operations of government make peace, and keep it. Without government, no community can endure, if it could ever exist at all. Since peace exists only among members of a community, whatever is needed for the establishment and preservation of a community is needed for the establishment and preservation of peace.

By "government," Adler means every aspect of a community's structure and organization. It includes the acts of commanding, the disposition and function to every member of the community, the arrangement of public offices, and the distribution of rights and privileges. The chief function of government is to settle differences among members of the community. That is the reason why government is needed to keep the peace. People frequently disagree. There must therefore be some structured way to get people who do disagree with each other to work for the common good. Otherwise, verbal quarrels will become violent quarrels, and the community may be destroyed. Any community, large or small, must adopt some rules of procedure for settling differences. The community must use either majority vote or the rule that all will accept the judgment of someone given the authority to decide the issue. Of course, neither rule of procedure will guarantee which side in a dispute is "right." The majority may be right or the minority may be right. The rule of procedure is not a way of always finding the right answer; it is only a way of always finding some answer without recourse to violence. Recourse to violence will not be avoided unless rules of procedure can be enforced against those who may refuse to comply with the decisions reached.

Local peace can exist only through the institutions of an effectively administered and just government. Citizens know that the local community cannot get along without civic organization and some form of administration, without ordinances, without courts, and without police. National peace also requires an effectively administered and just government.

Any government requires <u>both</u> authority and force or power in order to operate effectively for the purpose it was intended to serve and in order to compel obedience on the part of those who do not obey through moral obligation alone. Tyranny involves unauthorized force. The tyrant maintains the community only for the sake of exploiting it. Tyranny consists in the exercise of power for the private gain of the tyrant rather than in the interests of the community. Tyranny breeds civil strife just as powerless justice permits it. Neither force without authority nor authority without force can protect the community from civil strife. Neither can perpetuate peace.

Any government must provide three institutions for the peaceful settlement of quarrels between members of a community. First of all, there must be a legal institution which makes general rules which determine the procedure in the adjudication of disputes and general rules which determine the

standards of right and wrong by which conduct can be judged faultless or blameworthy. Secondly, there must be courts designed to render an impartial verdict on the disputed issues and to give judgments on certain penalties and compensations. Thirdly, there must be sheriffs or police with authorized force and sufficient power to bring offenders to trial and to execute the judgments of the courts. Unless courts are adequately supported by police power, their judgments remain impotent. According to Adler, nothing less than these three governmental institutions can discharge the task of keeping peace. These institutions of government are the necessary machinery for keeping quarrels on the level of conversation and for sustaining conversation until disputes are resolved. When resolutions are reached, the just government monopolizes the force required to translate words into action.

The ability of humans to settle differences by words distinguishes them from other animals. But humans have also used fists, stones, guns, and bombs to settle their differences. Humans cannot live in interaction without disagreements and quarreling. But because humans are both rational and animal, they can make peace or war--the one by discussion, the other by violence. Without just government and its institutions, though, discussion and conversation too frequently fail. Just government, composed of both law and force, reflects humanity's "rational animality." Therefore, just government and nothing but just government makes the human community and keeps its peace.

Chapter 7: "The Only Cause of War," pp. 69–83

Adler emphasizes that "the only cause of war is anarchy. Anarchy occurs when people or nations try to live together without each surrendering their sovereignty." (p. 69) Anarchy is the condition of those who try to live together without government. Only those who do not recognize any government over them regard themselves as sovereign.

Anarchy and sovereignty are inseparable. Throughout the whole of history and everywhere in the world today, the relationship of nation-states exhibits the twin features of sovereignty and anarchy. The price of sovereignty is war--war without interruption except for the alterations between war by the diplomats and war by the generals. Adler maintains that sovereign nations cannot remain in a state of potential war. The truce always ends in warfare as fighting always ends in a truce. Anarchy is not only responsible for the potential war between sovereign nations but it also fails to prevent the transition to actual combat.

Classifying the so-called "causes of war" has been the preoccupation of historians and experts of international relations. They have tried to determine the predisposing causes and the exciting causes of particular wars. They also try to allocate guilt and innocence by applying the criteria of just war and unjust war.

Each of the following elements has been claimed to be a "positive" cause of international war: economic rivalry; cultural antipathies; religious differences; individual acts of injustice; hate and fear; factions and ideologies. None of these factors and forces is by itself a cause of war, nor is war caused by any combination of them. Singly or together, these factors and forces cause war only when their action is not restrained by the institutions and machinery of government. Adler points out that each of these factors and forces occur in the life of a single society without causing war.

The presence of governmental controls prevents these factors from causing war within a single community. Thus, it is the absence of governmental controls which permits these factors to cause war between communities.

Adler believes that we shall never be able to eradicate the so-called "positive causes" of war mentioned above. But these "positive causes" can be effectively counteracted by government. Total lack of government, or deficiency in its operation, then becomes not only the "negative cause" of war but also the only cause we can control.

Adler holds that "we know now that only world government can prevent international wars. We know now the minimum amount of government which is needed, less than which could not effectively check the ever-present causes of war." (p. 75) He adds that "we know that we can prevent war by abolishing international anarchy." When enough people realize that anarchy is the only controllable cause of war, then the chances increase of our being able to cause world peace by world government.

"Anarchy as the only cause of war" means that it causes "potential war" as much as the actual warfare all of us recognize when shooting begins. Adler stresses that the absence of shooting is not the absence of war. Those who fall to understand this important point do not understand that no essential change has occurred in the transition from the diplomatic to the military means of carrying on the war between nation-states.

Von Clausewitz, the Prussian theorist of war, rightly understood that "war is not merely a political act, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, an execution of the same purpose with other means." (p. 76) He meant that actual warfare or physical fighting merely continues the potential war or the economic, social, and psychological fighting that goes on during a truce. According to Adler, this is the truth but not the whole truth. When the shooting ceases, diplomacy and international business take up where the soldiers leave off.

Diplomats work hard to give generals an advantageous position in the next war, just as generals work hard to give diplomats an advantageous position during the next truce. Adler defines diplomacy as every act short of shooting which one nation undertakes against another to better its position in the competition for power. In the anarchic world of sovereign nations, foreign policies and foreign transactions are only concerned with nations' self-interest, not with the common good of all peoples. Adler concludes that "so long as there are sovereign nations and international anarchy, war--actual or potential--is the order of the day." (p. 78)

Militarism and armaments are no more the cause of war than pacifism and disarmament conferences are the means to peace. The era of world peace will begin with the demise of diplomacy and with the end of all need for foreign policy. The state of potential war must be abolished in order to prevent the occurrence of actual war.

The just war tradition holds that nations are justified in using violence to defend themselves as a last resort after diplomacy has failed. Adler argues that the traditional distinction between just and unjust war never goes deeper than the exciting causes of military action. These are dramatic occasions and incidents which, in the judgment of a people or their officials, demand the substitution of overt war for covert war. The just war tradition, notes Adler, overlooks the fact that no occasion

or incident could excite actual warfare unless the nations were already potentially at war. The activating cause of military operations may be some real or imagined injustice suffered by one or both sides. But this by itself could not cause fighting. If law and government operated, the injustice could be corrected by peaceful means. Adler says that "when we pay attention to the underlying causes of war, not to the last-minute incidents before military movements begin, we cannot find a single criterion for distinguishing between just and unjust wars. Each sovereign nation participates in the international anarchy as much as every other." (p. 80)

In every war in history, soldiers and nations who fought them were convinced that they were fighting a just war. Every war of every nation was fought for a "righteous cause," for "justified national interests," and "in self-defense." Whenever people have talked about "just cause" in waging war, there has been no way of making the discussion of justice lead to a settlement of rights and wrongs without recourse to actual fighting. Not until international anarchy is replaced by world government will it be possible to substitute effective courts and public power for self-judgment and self-help. Then there will no longer be any need to talk about "just wars."

Chapter 8: "The Right and Wrong of Sovereignty," pp. 84--100

The German philosopher Hegel held that national sovereignty is a natural and inalienable right of nations. Hegel believed that peace is impossible and that war is forever unavoidable. Adler disagrees with Hegel and says that it is wrong to regard a multiplicity of independent nation-states as the natural and necessary order of political life. Hegel and most people have failed to distinguish the two meanings of "sovereignty."

The internal aspect of sovereignty signifies an attribute of civil government in relation to the individuals who are subject to its laws and administration. The federal government, the state governments, and the governments of chartered cities and incorporated towns have internal sovereignty to whatever degree each regulates matters not regulated by all the others. Internal sovereignty is inseparable from effective and legitimate government.

The external aspect of sovereignty signifies an attribute of a national political community as a whole in relation to other, distinct, and independent nation-states. Under a federated national government like the United States of America, no town, city, or state has any external sovereignty whatsoever. None has any foreign policy or foreign commitments. None has diplomats or armaments for dealing with other communities. Only national governments have external sovereignty in relation to other national governments.

Failure to distinguish between internal and external sovereignty was Hegel's mistake. Because one aspect (internal) of sovereignty is inseparable from government, he made the mistake of concluding that the other aspect (external) must also be inseparable from the nature of a political community.

In the sphere of foreign affairs, there is no meaning to the phrase "limited sovereignty." The external sovereignty of a political community is either complete or nonexistent. It is complete as long as the community remains an independent state. It is nonexistent when the nation-state ceases to be independent and becomes part of a larger political unit.

When one independent nation makes a treaty with another, that act does not limit its sovereignty for a contract voluntarily made by sovereign nations is binding only at the pleasure of the parties.

There is an important distinction between confederation (any sort of international organization such as the League of Nations or the United Nations) and federal world government. In a confederation, the real sovereignty or ultimate power remains in the national governments. According to Adler, any league or confederation of independent sovereign nation-states simply continues international anarchy. However, if and when federal world government exists, both national "external sovereignty" and "political independence," as well as "foreign affairs," "foreign policy," and "diplomacy" will become meaningless. Adler emphasizes that nothing less than world government can reduce international anarchy.

World government cannot co-exist with the sovereignty of independent nations. Either the multiplicity of sovereign and independent states can be done away with, or sovereign states remain judges of their own rights and agents of force, responsive only to superior force.

Chapter 9: "The Peace of Angels," pp. 101--109

The papal documents on war and peace (before 1943) were published in a volume entitled The Principles of Peace. The dominant theme of these papal statements is that peace is the work of justice and charity, both within the civil order of each state and in the international order. Adler notes that the papal statements lack the theme that world peace depends upon world government. According to the popes, international peace can be made and kept without the loss of national independence, without sacrifice of national external sovereignty, and without eliminating international anarchy. In 1939, Pope Pius XII said that "a fundamental postulate of any just and honorable peace is an assurance for all nations, great or small, powerful or weak, of their right to life and independence." (p. 102) Even though some have interpreted the papal statements as implying the need for limiting national sovereignty, Adler argues that "the failure to say plainly that peace is impossible so long as nations remain sovereign and independent will certainly not help people to think clearly about peace." (p. 105)

Adler disagrees with the Marxist view that when the injustice of capitalism is abolished, government will quietly wither away. Marx held that there will be no need for government when no exploiters are left. For Marxists, when the class war is over within nations, there will no longer be wars between nations. Adler responds that even though exploiters try to use government for their purposes, nothing but government can protect a just economy from the rise of a new exploiting class. Capitalism and imperialism are interlinked, but both thrive on the present international anarchy. It is international anarchy which permits the growth and operation of cartels, makes war the instrument of national survival, and requires armaments and the deceptions of diplomacy.

According to Alexander Hamilton, "if people were angels, no government would be necessary." Only angels can live together at peace without living under the coercive force of law, order, and government. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, there would have had to have been government in Eden even if Adam had not sinned so that the children of Adam could live together peacefully.

According to Adler, no one who knows the facts of life and history can defend anarchy--either for individual persons or for nations.

Chapter 10: "Civil War," pp. 110–112

Opponents of federal world government have argued: suppose international wars between independent nations are eliminated by abolishing their independence. Then there will be other forms of violent conflict between organized groups of people. If people refuse to call these conflicts "war" because they do not correspond to a definition of war as international, then they are simply hiding behind a verbal deception.

Adler answers this charge by first acknowledging that we should use the word "war" for organized violence between nations and for civil strife. It would make a significant difference if international wars were eliminated and only civil strife remained. But anyone must admit that nothing would be gained by eliminating international wars if, despite that fact, the total amount of violence in the world remains unchanged. But it certainly cannot be predicted that the amount and frequency of rebellions and civil wars in the world community will so increase as to make up for the elimination of international wars.

The degrees of peace vary directly with the degrees of justice and efficiency in the institutions of government. A proper understanding of the functions of government tells us how to obtain within the world community the highest degree of peace that is possible in any society.

Chapter 11: "The Degrees of Peace," pp. 113-135

No amount of social progress will ever provide humans with a life without pain and sorrow. Peace in the world win never relieve people of the search for peace in their own hearts. Hoping to make the world and human life perfect is simply "false and extravagant idealism." But sober idealism is practical without being utopian. Universal and perpetual peace is a practical ideal because it is possible for people as they are to attain it. People do not have to become angels or even saints in order to achieve a better world.

In primitive legal systems, each person decides for him/herself whether another person has committed an injury against him/her. The offended person may then proceed to exercise his/her own power to redress the injury, to obtain compensation, or to punish the offender and get the satisfaction of revenge. Each person, alone or with the help of others, must enforce the laws or customs of the tribe according to his/her own judgment. In more mature legal systems, the application of the rule of law is performed by a court. The society takes this function of judgment away from the offended individuals and concentrates it in certain persons whose authority is acknowledged. In mature legal systems, neither self-help nor self-judgment is permitted. The third stage of legal development consists in explicit legislation by persons or assemblies given the authority to make, adopt, and change the laws of the community.

According to some authorities, the "political community" or the "state" comes into being only when the legal system involves courts, judges, police, and other officers of law enforcement. So long as either self-judgment or self-help characterize the legal order, the governmental institutions which give a society political structure and organization do not exist.

Adler argues that the least degree of peace requires some degree of government. The only difference between the anarchic primitive tribal community and the modern society of nations is that the tribal peoples did not regard themselves as sovereigns. They knew that they were not self-sufficient, and so they were strongly motivated to keep the community together and to keep violence from destroying the community. Apart from this difference, all the elements of the primitive legal system are found in the present international system. Each sovereign state is its own judge as to whether it has suffered an injury, by reference to the customary standards of international conduct known as "general international law." Having judged itself offended against, it uses its own power (and sometimes that of others) to punish the offender or remedy the injury. It is therefore certain, says Adler, that there can be no degree of international peace so long as the international community remains anarchic. But when the international community ceases to be anarchic, it will also cease to be "international" in the sense of being a community or independent sovereign states. When the world's peoples live together under world federal government, they will no longer speak about "a society of nations," "international society," or "international law." They will then speak about a "global society of humans" and "world law."

The minimum conditions for some degree of peace, therefore, are impartial law, impartial judgment, and the impartial execution of the law, as opposed to making the law to suit one's self, being judge in one's own case, and resorting to private might for self-help. These are the minimum conditions of any government. The most just and efficient government will maintain the highest degree of peace. Defects in justice will occasion civil strife. Defects in efficiency will fail to provide peaceful means for remedying injustice, or will fall to support them by public force.

No degree of civil peace is so perfect as to be exempt from the disturbance by crime. Civil societies can experience three kinds of organized violence: rebellion (such as the French Revolution in 1789 or the Russian revolution in 1917); sedition (such as the rebellion of the thirteen colonies in North America against British rule); and civil war (such as the American Civil War). All three types of civil strife can be called wars but they differ from international wars in several respects. First of all, civil conflicts usually involve profound issues of justice. It is much easier to determine which party had just cause for armed uprising or armed resistance. Secondly, during the intervals between civil strife within a single political community, an actual state of peace exists, not a state of potential war. Even while insurgents are planning a rebellion, a weak degree of peace exists. Thirdly, civil wars seldom, if ever, end in truces or treaties between the contending parties. The conflict usually results in the reconstruction of peace which was temporarily interrupted. The most significant fact about the American Civil War is that it did not end with a treaty but with a declaration of amnesty. Lincoln's policy was that the South had never seceded, so the rebel states could be reabsorbed into the peace of the Union. It took a very bloody war to create a more perfect union.

There are two basic forms of government: constitutional and despotic. Despotism is the absolute rule by one person who regards him/herself as a personal sovereign above the law. Those under a

despot have no juridical rights to seek remedies for injustice and no legal power to protect themselves against oppression. Despots are not always tyrants; some have even been benevolent. But despotic government provides people with no peaceful or legal means for obtaining reforms.

Constitutional government is more just than the most benevolent despotism. It abolishes personal sovereignty. The basic political status under constitutional government is that of citizenship. All citizens share political equality and political freedom. But constitutional governments can be defective in two basic ways--in justice and in efficiency. If a constitutional government does not admit all the members of the society to the rights of citizenship, then it is unjust. The marks of a just constitution are universal suffrage and the abolition of all politically privileged classes. But political justice can be combined with economic injustice. Politically free people can be economically exploited. A just constitution must progressively approach an equitable distribution of economic opportunities and rewards. Economic democracy involves economic justice for all as well as economic freedom for all. The ultimate natural right to be protected is not necessarily the right of private property but rather freedom from exploitation, based on the equal right of everyone to work for their own happiness and the common good.

As long as a constitution remains politically unjust or as long as it protects economically privileged classes, the community lives under the threat of civil strife. The efficiency of constitutional government becomes a factor in preventing civil violence. If political and economic reforms cannot be accomplished by due process of law, then they will be accomplished by violence. A constitution which does not provide legal means for its own amendments, which provides no legal means for impeachment of persons who have abused their public office, which fails to provide sanctions to protect the rights of citizenship, will be inefficient. If a constitution is unjust because it deprives people of political status or economic rights and because it offers them no legal means to remedy their situation, then justice lies on the side of the revolutionary movements.

By improvements in political justice, the occasions for civil strife can be removed or reduced. By improvements in governmental efficiency, the occasions which remain to generate serious divisions can be prevented from turning violent. Adler argues that political institutions and economic systems can be perfected to the point where civil peace within a community is no longer threatened by any form of justified civil violence. The same reasoning can be applied to a future world government. World government must be both constitutional and democratic. It must be both politically and economically just. It must provide effective machinery for continually improving justice by due process of law.

Chapter 12: "A Society of Men," pp. 136—151

The conditions required for any degree of peace are the same regardless of the size of the population and the area of land. Peace exists wherever there is a political community living under government. History shows a slow but steady growth in the size of political units. There is no reason to suppose that this development will reach its natural limit until the world community is formed.

Adler admits that it will be difficult to form a world government. But it is not impossible. None of the obstacles to world government arise from the limitations or imperfections of human nature.

Adler insists that "nothing less than world government will establish world peace, even in the least degree." (p. 138) To prove this thesis, Adler asks anyone to imagine the maximum extent of political organization short of world government. Suppose the world were divided into two regional federations, for example, Atlantic and Pacific communities of federated states. Each of these two regional federations would retain its external sovereignty, having its own foreign policy, diplomats, and defensive armaments which may be used aggressively. In this imagined situation, a state of war will not have been abolished. Actual warfare may be postponed for a much longer time than it has ever been in the world's history, especially if the two regional federations are evenly matched in physical resources, industrial capacity, human power, and military power. But the balance will not last forever. Interregional warfare would remain as inevitable as international warfare is now. The most enduring truce is not the least degree of peace. For Adler, between a single world government and two regional federations or a confederation of nations, there is no choice if world peace is the aim. The difference between world government and any plan short of it is the difference between institutions that can secure lasting peace and arrangements that can result only in a truce. Any plan for world peace which retains national sovereignty can only hope to produce international truces.

International law is inadequate for lasting world peace. International law simply consists of maxims which are usually acknowledged by nations. It is at least customary for each nation to demand respect for its own sovereignty. But nations frequently violate each other's rights and frequently fail to practice their obligations. International law is as powerless to prevent such failures as it is to prevent wars which result from such failures. General international law merely describes the customary grounds for international conflict. It does not prescribe what every nation must do or suffer the penalty or law enforcement. Particular international law (treaties) is not always followed by the contractual parties. Most treaty obligations are followed and many controversies over treaty obligations have been voluntarily submitted to courts of arbitration and voluntarily executed. But when matters of paramount national interests are at stake, international law breaks down. The matter may or may not be submitted to an impartial tribunal. Even if it is, the party adversely affected may refuse to comply with the court's judgment. The other party must help itself or seek the help of others. This means war.

Another serious limitation of international law is that it holds all the members of a nation collectively responsible for the actions of its nationals. War is not made against the particular individuals who violate a treaty. It is made against all the people of the nation to which those particular individuals belong, without respect to who is or who is not at fault.

International law is law divorced from political institutions. It is a law of nations living together anarchically, not a law of people living together under government. It is a law of war (potential or actual), not a law of peace. Law will function effectively in world affairs only when it ceases to be "international law" and when it becomes "world law."

International law, composed of customs and treaties, belongs to the present era of world history. Under the nation-state system, it serves a valuable purpose. However, it can never serve the purpose of making or keeping peace. Both Rousseau and Kant realized that treaties make truces, not peace.

Chapter 13: "The Inexorable Alternative," pp. 152—163

When world peace begins, all the familiar aspects of internationalism, such as warfare and truces, must disappear. We know from the League of Nations and from any other variation of it (United Nations, conferences, congresses of independent nations) that they cannot succeed. But we also know that the only arrangements which can ultimately succeed cannot be instituted now.

People mature slowly but human societies and institutions mature even more slowly. The rate of mature growth for societies and institutions depends upon the capacity of people to change their traditions. Peace cannot be built from a blueprint or a plan. It is a natural consequence of certain political institutions that must be developed.

Internationalism is not the birth of peace but it prepares the way for peace. Adler says that in our effort to promote the coming of peace, we should encourage the development of international institutions such as the League of Nations (United Nations) and the World Court. Regional federations of nations might also be part of the transition from internationalism to world government.

Part Three: THE PROBABILITY OF PEACE: Chapters 14—21

Chapter 14: "An Optimistic View of History," pp. 167—177

People before the 18th century emphasized permanence and repetition rather than change and progress. The Enlightenment developed the modern notion that though wars have always been, they need not always be. The idea of progress and the possibility of peace go together.

The path of history is neither a circle nor a straight line. Its evolutionary progress follows more of a spiral path. There are many relapses which interrupt and qualify the slow progress upward. Hegel and Marx developed the dialectic view of historical development. But Hegel deceived himself into thinking that the goal of the historical spirit was the Prussian state. Marx held that world communism was the final goal. Adler argues that both Hegel and Marx overlooked the contingencies in history and the role of individual freedom in the making of social choices. Hegel and Marx made necessity their idol. For them, humanity's only freedom lies in recognizing its future and accepting the fatalism of the wave of the future.

Adler insists that humans have the free capacity to brutalize and degrade their lives as well as to humanize and civilize it. For good or for evil, human history represents the work of human reason and human freedom. In his treatises Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View and Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant saw that the perfection of civilization depended upon the establishment of a civil society which had a just political constitution. Universal and perpetual peace is the goal toward which humanity is striving. But Kant's optimism was qualified. He believed that lasting world peace was an unattainable ideal. History is doomed to fall short of its realization.

Adler maintains that we are in a position to be more optimistic than Kant. What for Kant could be no more than a "regulative ideal" has become for us over two hundred years later a "practicable objective."

We modern people simply enjoy a longer historical perspective with which to better predict the future. Adler believes that it is not unreasonable to foresee the coming of world peace and the beginning of its perpetuation within the next five hundred years.

Chapter 15: "The Future of Democracy," pp. 178--187

During much of the past, most people suffered under despotic rule. While some people still live under despotism, a larger number of people than ever before live under either republican or monarchical constitutional government. Constitutional governments are the necessary prerequisite for political democracy and a just economy. Within the twentieth century, many constitutional governments are democracies. But only in some nations has the justice and efficiency of constitutional government been perfected to the point where due process of law affords peaceful means for social and economic change. After the First World War, the anarchy and inequality of the international situation allowed the growth for fascism, the dictatorship of a faction and its leader. In the midst of the Second World War, Adler feels that if the United Nations lose, democratic institutions have less chance of surviving anywhere. But if the United Nations win the Second World War, then democratic institutions have a great chance of spreading where they have never existed. The hope is that in the future constitutional governments will flourish all over the world without interludes of despotism.

Economic disadvantages, racial and religious discriminations, the privilege of wealth and position, inequality of opportunity, and educational failures make worldwide democracy a thing of the future. Constitutionalism tends toward democratic rule. Its fundamental ideas of citizenship, political liberty, and equality before the law cannot be defended as applying to only some people and not to all. Once these ideas are accepted, the "people" as a whole are believed to possess inalienable rights.

Adler believes that "the international anarchy, the imperialism it permits, the wars it necessitates, the armaments it requires, the banditry of the cartels it cannot control, the secret diplomacy and the deceits of foreign policy with which it demoralizes domestic politics-- all these things weaken constitutional government, wherever it exists, and impede the growth of democracy." (p. 137) He further believes that the spread of constitutional governments and the gradual democratization of the world are phases in the progress toward lasting worldwide peace. The growth of world peace is inseparable from the political developments which history makes probable in the next five hundred years.

Chapter 16: "Progress Toward Peace," pp. 188--208

There are two fundamental probable generalizations that describe the pattern of political growth:

(1) the tendency of political development from despotism to constitutionalism, and then from oligarchy to democracy; and (2) the tendency of political expansion from communities small in population and area to large and populous states. These two tendencies give Adler hope that a world community will eventually be formed and that a world government will be instituted to minimize and prevent civil strife. He says that it is not crucial whether his prediction of five hundred years is the maximum or the minimum for these developments. What is important practically is the realization that this twentieth century is a fundamental turning point.

In ancient history, families joined with other families to form tribes. Later, tribes joined other tribes to form city-states. Some city-states like Rome acquired empires. During feudal times, city-states joined other kingdoms to form nation-states. Nation-states differ from city-states in that nation-states combine centralized governments with subordinate decentralized agencies. Nation-states have a hierarchy of local subdivisions into provinces and departments, counties and towns. The nation-state is only the latest, but not the last, stage in the process of political expansion. With his limited historical perspective, Aristotle thought that the city-state was the end of political expansion. With his historical knowledge of the nineteenth century, Hegel believed that the nation-state must be the ultimate stage of political evolution. We in the twentieth century should see that the process will go on until the natural limit is reached. The only limit to political expansion is the world state with a world government. Nations will become units of local government, just as counties and cities became local centers in the historical process of nationalization.

The world state is the last stage of political growth which will reflect both the unity of the planet as the territorial basis for humanity's political life and the unity of human nature, underlying all racial and cultural differences, as the psychological basis for world citizenship. The increasing economic interdependence of all parts of the industrialized world will facilitate this last stage of global unification.

Chapter 17: "The Physics of Peace," pp. 209--220

The physical conditions of world peace are geopolitical in the sense that geography and the distribution of natural resources affect the formation of a world political community. Moral and cultural forces are spiritual factors in the formation of a world community. Progress occurs only when both sets of conditions can be harmonized. In the progress toward world peace so far, the physical conditions have overrun the spiritual. For Adler, the fundamental obstacles to peace in the immediate future are spiritual while the fundamental opportunities for peace in the immediate future are physical.

When Alexander the Great wept because he thought there were no more empires to conquer, he did not know how small was the part of the world that his armies had overrun. In Western civilization, the world-image gradually enlarged from a Mediterranean world to a European world. For all practical purposes, Orient and Occident belonged to separate "worlds" as late as the eighteenth century. Only recently has it become a world of the five continents. Most of the classical peace projects talked of "universal peace" but meant little more than Europe. Only Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant began thinking of the peace problem in "global" terms.

Modern transportation and communication have shrunk the political world. The physical world is the same dimensions it has been throughout recorded history. But to think politically, we must now think in terms of time as well as in terms of distance. The same physical distance changes socially and politically according to the time and effort required to travel through it or to make contacts across it. Every important technological advance thus alters the geopolitical situation. It is impossible for people to form a political group unless they can communicate with each other. Without some type of physical contact, neither cultural nor political community is possible. Physically the world is becoming a single neighborhood because of radio, television, telephone, motion pictures, and rapid air travel.

Chapter 18: "The Economic Community," pp. 221--229

All people of the earth now belong to a single economic community. The industrial economy of the modern world increases many times the interdependence of separate communities. Under industrialism, nations have long ceased to be capable of an isolated and self-sufficient economic life.

This economic interdependence must be matched by a world political organization. Until political institutions match the economic realities, physical conditions will exert their influence in the direction of war.

Chapter 19: "The Obstacles to Peace," pp. 230—253

The obstacles to peace are all moral or spiritual. We must move beyond the physics of peace to psychology. We must go beyond technology to global education. We must come to realize that happiness should be attainable by each individual without in any way impeding or preventing an attainment of the same goods by others. We must teach that moral virtue is the habit of wanting the right thing in the right order in the right quantity with regard for the social context.

World peace cannot be made unless people give up the things which stand in its way. All of the moral obstacles to peace arise from disordered desires or unlimited desires for things which are good in their place and under some limitation which respects the needs of others.

If people misconceive their happiness as consisting in money, fame, or power, they do not really want peace even if they delude themselves into thinking that war disturbs their pursuit of these things. There is nothing intrinsically evil in money, fame, or power. What is evil is the infinite lust which seeks to possess them at all costs--the desire to have them in unlimited quantities and before anything else. No individual or nation can seek unlimited wealth without impoverishing others, without increasing the inequitable distribution of material goods. No individual or nation can wield unlimited power without enslaving or dominating others in some way. Therefore, the moral obstacles to peace can only be overcome by changing the desires of individuals and nations.

What is sufficient for civil peace is not homogeneity but justice--political and economic. For world peace to be made it is not necessary that there exist only one world language, one race, or one religion. Political unity does not require "sameness" in any of these areas. What is demanded,

though, is tolerance between the various cultures, races, and world religions. Differences among the various races, religions, and cultures do present obstacles to world peace only because of prejudice and discrimination. Moral obstacles to world peace are genuinely surmountable by education and by enlargements of experience. It is Adler's belief that all types of prejudice can overcome.

At present, all peoples are "fit" to rule themselves but not all are "ready." A future world community and world government require a worldwide tradition of constitutional democracies. None of the federated parts could be dictatorships or absolute monarchies. Despotism and constitutional groups cannot federate with each other. Not all peoples of the world are ready by tradition or experience for constitutional democracy. They can be helped by others only to the extent that imperialism is renounced by all. They can also be helped through advice and example. But each of the present nations must achieve political maturity by themselves. This will take time.

Adler then concentrates on four moral obstacles for world peace in the future. The first obstacle is racial discrimination. To the extent that racial prejudice rests upon political or economic conflicts, it can be cured by removing the conditions responsible for such conflicts. A world community under a federal government would have to obliterate racial discriminations by adequate protection of human rights and by sustaining the positive values of cultural diversity. Adler believes that families and schools can rear children without teaching them prejudice.

The second obstacle is economic nationalism. The present wealthier nations are strongly adverse to most of the economic implications of world federation. They think that free trade among the members of the federation would jeopardize their present advantages and monopolies. The economic conditions of world peace require that world prosperity take precedence over national prosperity. Economic nationalism thus explains why wealthier nations will be reluctant to choose the conditions indispensable to world peace.

The third obstacle is political nationalism. There is a general misconception among many that world federation means that people will be required to give up their independence. The only thing which nations must give up for world government to become a reality is their <u>external</u> sovereignty. The various federated states of a world government would not become dependencies or subjugated provinces or exploited colonies. With respect to each other, all the states in a federation remain equally independent. None falls under the dominion of the other. Each state in a world federation would be subordinate units of local government, each retaining <u>internal</u> sovereignty in its own locality. Because of the failure to distinguish between external and internal sovereignty, many people find themselves emotionally opposed to world government. (Americans can overcome this obstacle by reviewing American history from 1776 to 1789. When the individual states joined together in a federal government, each of the states retained their internal sovereignty; they simply gave up their external sovereignty or their right to war against each other.)

The fourth obstacle to world peace is excessive patriotism. Patriotism can be good when it means loyalty to the welfare of one's community. No community can long survive without such loyalty. However, national patriotism can be harmful when it leads to the attitude "my country, right or wrong!" In this case, patriotism becomes a violent antagonism to everything foreign. However, it is misleading to say (as Tolstoy has) that patriotism is the cause of war or national rivalry. It is misleading to say this because nationalism precedes patriotism. It is thus more proper to say that the

misdirection or excess of patriotism results from the international anarchy. Adler argues that as long as nations retain their external sovereignty and are thus always potentially at war, it is impossible to dissociate the proper from the improper aims of patriotism. Love of one's country (patriotism) will remain antagonistic to love of one's fellow human beings (humatriotism) as long as one's country does not include all people in a single political fellowship.

Global humatriotism will not diminish the devotion which people will always have for their local community. People will always have a natural affection for their "homeland," for their place of birth and the companions of their youth. Global humatriotism will merely extend the range of their allegiance.

Chapter 20: "Revolution for Peace," pp. 254--264

The prevalent notions about national independence and sovereignty are not innate ideas. But such ideas have been inculcated by miseducation. Adler is confident that the confusions about national independence and sovereignty can be removed by sound teaching and sound education.

The essential problem for promoting a future world government lies in moral education-- in redirection of human desires. But the schools cannot effectively teach justice in a society which permits and even rewards injustice. However, there is a reciprocal relationship between education and society. Social changes redirect and reinforce education; sounder education will extend economic and political reforms.

When more and more people realize that it is not great wealth which causes happiness and when they understand that true happiness depends on a decent sufficiency of external goods, not upon wasteful surpluses, they will see that they will not be disadvantaged by other people having enough as long as they themselves also have enough. They will see that they are better off in a world in which they are neither humanly nor economically better off than other people.

To the wrong question "how can we be better off at the expense of others," any answer will oppose world peace. To the right question "how can world affairs be rearranged so that all people are better off," the only answer will stipulate the political and economic conditions of world peace. The real choice people must make is between these two questions. Which question they ask will depend upon what they want--either to retain the economic advantages they now have or to improve the spiritual conditions of human life on Earth.

Chapter 21: "Education for peace," pp. 265--278

By the middle of the nineteenth century, only a small part of any population received adequate schooling. A college liberal education was reserved for the rich. In this century, state institutions, scholarships, and other devices have helped to provide for many people what should be the minimum education for every child. During the next century, the goal should be to make universal education as universal as suffrage and citizenship.

Many people today misconceive freedom as freedom from government. According to Adler, they confuse anarchic liberty with civil liberty. Political freedom does not mean self-determination in the anarchic sense of recognizing no authority except one's own will and thus yielding obedience only to superior force. True freedom must involve liberty under law and just government. In a just society, people should not have more 1iberty than they can use justly nor less than they need to live a good life. More liberty than this becomes criminal license. Less deprives people of their human dignity and reduces them to instruments for the selfishness of others.

Only liberal education can discipline people for the political use of freedom which is the meaning of citizenship. Children can be prepared for citizenship in school but adults, who have already entered upon the duties of citizenship, must be kept intellectually alive by the consideration and discussion of the basic ideas which illuminate economic and political problems. This means that there must be a continuation of liberal education for adults. In fact, Adler calls adult education "the ultimate educational task of democratic societies." (p. 268)

Truly democratic education, as well as actual experience of democratic life, must become worldwide before people everywhere can become citizens of the world in addition to being citizens of their local community. Adler keeps to his prediction that the members of the human family can be made ready for world citizenship within the next five hundred years.

Just as individuals give up anarchy and savagery for citizenship and civilization, nations must give up external sovereignty for justice and peace. Educational discussions should concern the principles involved in making lasting world peace. Most "peace organizations" and collegiate debates have rather centered around the issue between pacifism and militarism. True peace education must undermine the fallacies of political nationalism which is the root cause of wars. It must teach the importance of world citizenship.

Two extreme positions are wrong in their prediction of the possibility of world federation. The first extreme is the "institutionalist" error of supposing that peace can be established by world political institutions prior to any of the moral and intellectual changes needed to make those institutions sufficiently acceptable to enough people. The other extreme is the "moralist" error of supposing that the heart and mind of humanity must be completely ready before the necessary institutions can be operative. The true answer lies in the middle. People must be morally and intellectually ready for world political institutions--but only to some degree. While the moralist underestimates the educative influence of political institutions, the institutionalist neglects the psychological soil in which institutions must take root. If the moralist were correct, peace could never take place. If the institutionalist were correct, peace could be established in our own lifetime. For Adler, a more reasonable conclusion follows from recognizing the truth in both extremes. In order to establish world peace through a federal world government in the next five hundred years, there must be continual movement between the moral and the institutional factors. They are mutually supporting and reciprocally related as cause and effect.

Part Four: THE PRACTICALITY OF PEACE: Chapters 22--24

Chapter 22: "Ends," pp. 281--287

Throughout this book, Adler has argued that a lasting and global world peace will be made but not in our time. It is not irrational to foresee the existence of a world community in which our posterity will actually live as citizens. But there will be wars until we succeed in making peace. Adler feels that it is quite possible to be a pessimist for the short run but an optimist in the long run.

We who now live should have two practical objectives. First, we must work for the longest truce that can be made to postpone another world war. Secondly, we must work for the lasting peace which can eventually be instituted to prevent all wars. These two objectives are not incompatible goals to work for at the same time. Prolonging the truce between nations is not only an immediate goal but is itself one of the means to the remote goal of a lasting peace.

In the past, education has been hampered by economic slavery and by social inequalities. It has often been the selfish tool of the privileged classes. Besides being the instrument for oppressing the many, education had failed to enlighten the few. But a social revolution is beginning. Eventually all people will consider themselves citizens of the world under a government which unites rather than divides their allegiance.

Chapter 23: "Means," pp. 288--295

Our ultimate goal should not be merely "peace in our time" because that is nothing but a temporary truce. We should strive to create a lasting peace. A truce is only a means. But contemporary proposals must follow these criteria in order to prolong the truce between nations: they should commit no political or economic injustice; they should not create an alliance of nations which merely preserves an unjust status quo; they should promote human rights and freedoms; they should institute international agencies to provide people with the image of an international community and with the political experience needed for future global institutions; they should multiply those international agencies such as the International Labor Office for the purpose of equalizing educational opportunity throughout the world and to guide education everywhere in the training of citizens. In whatever ways we fail to make a truce good by these criteria, we shall fail to postpone the next war.

We cannot make peace in our time but we can promote its creation. Citizens should urge their national governments to form a permanent peace conference which will function until peace is finally made. This peace conference should perform the work of a constitutional convention, drafting the articles for the constitution of world government, and considering the steps that must be taken to accomplish its ratification by the nations to be federated.

Those involved in education can use education as a prime instrument for effecting the mental, moral, and cultural changes prerequisite to peace. Educators can instruct people about the possibility and

the probability of a durable worldwide peace, the conditions of its attainability, and the rewards of its attainment.

Chapter 24: "The Long Run." pp. 296--301

A significant factor which dominates discussions about war and peace is that people tend to be temperamentally averse to "the long run." The concept of a lasting world peace through world federation will have no appeal to the impatient, to those who only focus on present pleasures and immediate goods, or to those who cannot bring themselves to want peace for their posterity. If we and the next few generations do nothing to promote a lasting peace, then we ought to become pessimistic about the long run.

We know that in our individual lives, planning for our future is a mark of maturity and prudence. The unexamined life is not worth living. The unplanned life will, at its end, not be worth examining. Temperance is the habit of foregoing immediate pleasures and profits for the sake of a greater good in the future. Fortitude consists in suffering present pains and hardships for the sake of a greater, though remote, good. The building of medieval Gothic cathedrals followed the plan which took for granted that no single generation could raise the structure from foundation to spire. Some of these cathedrals took three hundred years to complete even though they were used for worship before they were finished. The building of world democratic institutions requires a similar assumption and attitude.

Most people are inclined to work for the welfare of their children. Perhaps there is some failure of the imagination to work for the welfare of our grandchildren.

Perhaps there is a similar failure of imagination with respect to our neighbors. Most people consider their neighbors to be only those who live around them. For the cause of world peace, people must consider everyone their neighbors and realize that the common good belongs to the whole human race.

Some social problems demand the cooperation of contemporary persons. The problem of peace demands the collaboration of many generations of people the world ever. The problem of peace will remain unsolved until people have understood it well enough to adjust their thinking to its demands. "Once this is understood, membership in the human race should be enough to bring their virtues into play and to overcome their indifference to the long run." (p. 301)